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From the photo exhibition by Ian Alderman (see article page 35). Alderman combines modern photographs of the operations of the DOVO-SEDEE bomb disposal
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IN THIS ISSUE:

FROM THE DIRECTOR
In this issue of The Journal, our Editorial section examines the relationship between improvised explosive devices (IED) and the International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS). The evolving nature of humanitarian mine action (HMA)—particularly in areas such as Iraq and Syria—has generated debate on how to incorporate IEDs into
the current IMAS or whether to create entirely new standards specific to IEDs. With
thought-provoking contributions from Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining’s (GICHD) Guy Rhodes and Danish Demining Group’s (DDG) Robert Keeley,
we welcome community feedback and contributions from the field for Issue 22.1
(Spring 2018).
Our Feature section focuses on stockpile management and highlights articles from
Eric Berman and Benjamin King (Small Arms Survey); Marlène Dupouy (United Nations
Mine Action Service); Elvan Isikozlu, Matthias Krötz, and Claire Trancart (BICC); Lee
Moroney (Golden West Humanitarian Foundation), and Robert White (GICHD).
This issue’s Field Notes section features a tremendous selection of articles: including discussions on HMA’s role in IEDs clearance by Craig McInally and Hans
Risser (Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)), Sustainable Development Goals’ impact on
HMA by Ursign Hofmann (GICHD) and Olaf Juergensen (United Nations Development
Programme), and explosive safety awareness by Geoff Carton (CALIBRE Systems, Inc.)
and Laura Grindstaff (Bristol Site Contractors, LCC).
In addition, we’re pleased to feature two photographic essays in this issue.
Photographer Ian Alderman writes about his exhibition, “Recovering the Past,” an
innovative project that brings together two separate groups of men whose origins
are a century apart albeit united from the First World War through present-day conflicts. His exhibit is currently featured at the United Nations in Geneva and as a component of the centenary commemorations to the Battle of Passchendaele at the In
Flanders Fields Museum, Ypres, Belgium. In addition, Vanessa Finson (NPA) and worldrenowned photographer Giovanni Diffidenti essay the government of Colombia, las
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarais de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) and
NPA’s joint pilot project to survey and clear anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).
Recognizing the importance of ordnance identification resources: Roly Evans (GICHD)
and Eric de Brun (Ripple Design) highlight the Collaborative ORDnance Data Repository’s
(CORD) 2018 upgrades, and Howard Rudat (MAPPS, Inc.) reports on his Landmines App
mobile application. Additionally, this issue presents the research conducted by Andy
Smith (University of Genoa) and William Bagley (Johns Hopkins University) on their
Black Adder disruptors, which are designed to provide explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) operatives with open-source information on low-cost disruptors.
For those of you who have not yet discovered James Madison University’s Scholarly
Commons or simply “the repository,” I invite you to explore the site. The repository
is housed within Digital Commons, the leading hosted repository software for universities, colleges, law schools, and research centers. Scholarly material and special
collections in Digital Commons repositories are easily discoverable in Google, Google
Scholar, and other search engines. Additionally, articles in Digital Commons repositories are indexed in the Digital Commons Network, a free discovery tool for full text
scholarly articles used by researchers worldwide. The Journal archives are housed in
the repository, and CISR is in the process of curating our own historical research materials to begin developing the world’s only online repository of mine action and conventional weapons destruction documents. In the near future, we will be asking the
community to contribute to this repository so this vital information is not lost. Please
explore The Journal repository here http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/.
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sive devices (IED) should be included in current International Mine Action Standards
opinion on this subject, encourage conversation and debate, and welcome responses
to be published online and/or in print in Issue 22.1.
The views expressed in articles published in The Journal of Conventional Weapons
Destruction are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, James Madison University, or
the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery.
If readers would like to respond to editorials contained herein or submit an editorial to The Journal, please contact the publications staff at: cisr-journal@jmu.edu.

Improvised Explosive Devices and the
International Mine Action Standards
by Guy Rhodes, Ph.D. [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]

I

mprovised explosive devices (IED) are not new in mine action;
they have contributed to explosive ordnance contamination in
post-conflict settings since the advent of humanitarian demining almost 30 years ago.1,2
What is new is that the systematic deployment of IEDs by armed
groups is occurring today on a greater scale. The prevalence of use
of these weapons by highly visible groups such as the Islamic State
has accentuated the profile of IEDs even further. In addition, a large
proportion of the IEDs deployed are victim-operated (VOIED) and
contribute to a new landmine emergency characterized by a systematic production, standardization of designs, and the deployment of
hundreds of thousands of locally-manufactured landmines. These
recent developments have led to debate on how IEDs are defined in
relation to key conventions such as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC), on the required competency levels needed to
engage in IED disposal (IEDD) activities, and on the applicability
of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) to provide the
framework for mine action operations concerning IEDs.
This editorial provides a historic perspective on the extent of
IEDD operations conducted by mine action actors, explains the
scope and applicability of the IMAS to address all explosive ordnance including improvised devices, and suggests amendments to
the IMAS to provide improved guidance to respond to IED contamination in a humanitarian context. 3

A Historical Perspective
Since the late 1980s, humanitarian demining in Afghanistan
has addressed VOIEDs as an integral part of mine action operations. The HALO Trust, for instance, has cleared over 1,400
IEDs in Afghanistan during this period. In Sri Lanka, the same
organization has cleared almost 74,000 locally-manufactured
landmines (over one-third of all landmines cleared by the organization in Sri Lanka), and some 1,250 more complex IEDs since
2002. In Colombia, a further 280 locally-manufactured landmines were cleared by The HALO Trust between 2013 and 2016.4
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In Iraq and Syria, during the course of the last 12 months,
MAG (Mines Advisory Group) cleared nearly 16,000 IEDs, mostly
locally-manufactured landmines, but also sizeable numbers of
radio-controlled, and command-detonated anti-vehicle devices
that were abandoned (see Figures 3 and 4). 5
Elsewhere in the world, improvised devices are addressed within
mine action programs from Africa (e.g., Angola), to Europe (e.g.,
Kosovo), and to Southeast Asia (e.g., Thailand). Few major conflicts
have occurred where improvised devices have not contributed to explosive contamination. In all these cases, the survey and clearance
of improvised devices by mine action operators were undertaken
within the framework of the IMAS. Image 2 presents examples of
the wide array of IEDs addressed by mine action operators.
Colombia is a case in point. A large portion of the territory in
Colombia is contaminated with IEDs laid by armed groups (see
Figure 1). The great majority of the IEDs are victim-operated,
locally-manufactured landmines (see Image 1), but other types of
devices including timer-initiated and command-initiated IEDs are
also present. Among further threats, there are gas cylinders used as
projectiles, as well as improvised mortars and rockets, which often
use explosives that have been prepared in an artisanal manner. In
Colombia, 11,485 victims have been recorded since 1990.6
Colombia has been guided by the IMAS in its efforts to address
this contamination. It has used them to develop a full set of National
Mine Action Standards (NMAS) as a framework to manage the national program of land release.

The Objective and Scope of the IMAS
The IMAS have been developed to provide a safety, quality, and
operational framework for mine action and to promote a common and consistent approach to the conduct of mine action operations. The IMAS provide guidance, establish principles, and—in
some cases—define international requirements and specifications.
They offer a frame of reference, which encourages managers of mine
action programs and projects to achieve and demonstrate agreed

Figure 1. Extent of mine contamination in Colombia (2017).

Image 1. An example of an improvised landmine found in Colombia.

Figure courtesy of DAICMA.

Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.

levels of effectiveness and safety. The IMAS provide a common language, and recommends the formats and rules for handling data,
which enables the accurate and timely exchange of information.7
The IMAS are not themselves standard operating procedures
(SOP). They provide a framework for NMAS, local SOPs, rules, instructions, and codes of practice—documents that provide more
details on how mine action requirements are to be achieved in a particular context.
Critically, the IMAS are framed by a humanitarian imperative
where landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are considered first and foremost a humanitarian concern and should
be addressed from a humanitarian perspective (see Figure 2). In
this regard, the framing of standards and their application to national mine action programs ref lect the fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, equality, and humanity
so that mine action is focused on giving support to those who are
most vulnerable. 8
Mine action operations are therefore not defined by weapon type (i.e., they include improvised devices) but by the objectives they pursue (i.e., humanitarian) and by the context
in which they are conducted (i.e., one that permits respect for
humanitarian principles).
As mentioned, the engagement of mine action operators in
IEDD has, and should continue to follow, the same principles

used for humanitarian demining operations. As such, engagement
should continue to be based on a positive response to the following
four questions:
• Is the aim of the task humanitarian (as opposed to security
or military)?
• Is the environment conducive for safe and secure operations?
• Is humanitarian access possible and the device out of play
and cold?9
• Does the operator have the necessary skills and equipment to
undertake the relevant search and disposal operation?
If a threat assessment determines that an IED is still within an
active setting and no humanitarian access is possible, then it is a matter for relevant security forces to address. Furthermore, if a device is of
a complexity that requires a skillset or equipment that is not present,
then additional internal competencies must be developed, equipment purchased or specialist assistance requested. Such an approach
is not restricted to IEDs but is the same for all explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations concerning landmines and ERW.
None of this is meant to downplay the challenges associated with
responses to IEDs. However, it is important to note that adopting a
sound, risk-management approach for IEDs is similar to that for the
wide spectrum of unexploded ordnance (UXO), which can range from
simple items, such as grenades, all the way through to complex items
such as surface-to-air missiles with hypergolic, liquid-fueled systems.

What are the limitations for mine action
operators to engage with IEDs? Is this
different from other explosive devices?

Factors that Complicate the Debate on IEDs
Current debates on who should be doing what and where with
regards to IEDD, particularly in the Middle East, are testament to
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Figure 2. A schematic to illustrate the objective and scope of the IMAS. The IMAS provide a framework to guide mine action in pursuit of its
humanitarian objectives and in accordance with humanitarian principles.
Figure courtesy of GICHD.

the existence of differing perspectives on IEDs. Military, commercial, and NGO operators all have valid positions but also different
objectives and references in their work, as well as different modalities, competencies, and capabilities.
The current debate has some strong parallels with those associated with the early days of mine action when
• Issues of ownership of the topic of demining between NGOs,
commercial, and military took place.
• NGO involvement in broader EOD—in addition to demining—was questioned.
• Challenges existed in understanding requirements for a transition from a military context to a humanitarian one.
• There was a need to establish competence requirements for
humanitarian operations and associated training responses.
In all these past instances, the conclusions of the debates resulted in the increase of empowerment of mine action actors and ultimately the strengthening of the IMAS to more comprehensively
frame operations that support humanitarian objectives.
In the current debate on ownership of the IED issue, it is important to safeguard the IMAS as the principle framework for IEDD
work that is bounded by the objectives and contexts appropriate
for mine action. To optimize the effectiveness of IEDD activities,
however, collaboration between military, commercial, and NGO
operators is important at a procedural level, including appropriate
information exchange.
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Current discussions on IEDs from both a political and operational perspective are complicated by the term IED, that is not at all specific but used to describe many different devices which may have
only one thing in common—the fact that their construction is improvised or that they are locally-manufactured. The many types and
classifications of IEDs vary from simple to complex, and have been
characterized in a lexicon published by the United Nations Mine
Action Service (UNMAS).10 They include time-delayed IEDs, projected IEDs, and command IEDs, including suicide IEDs in vests
and on vehicle-borne platforms.
There is also a supposition that IEDs are all complex devices,
whereas, in reality, while they can present considerable additional
technical challenges during search and disposal operations, IEDs
can also be relatively simple and standardized in design. The
vast majority of IEDs addressed to date in Iraq and Syria exist as
locally manufactured landmines. They have been produced on a
massive scale by the Islamic State and are more readily detected and
disposed of than many industrially-manufactured landmines that
may, for instance, have a low metal content.
The rising impact of IED attacks in public places has been extensively documented by Action On Armed Violence (AOAV).11
Armed groups play an active and influential role in wars in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, and pose serious
threats to national security in Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Such IED attacks

raise the profile of IEDs as an issue of concern, but most incidents relate to car bombs
and suicide attacks that fall well outside the
parameters of mine action and the IMAS.
Such devices and circumstances should be
dealt with in separate guides and standards
for use by security forces.
Incidents involving IEDs should be unpacked to separate IED terror attacks using
command detonation from those initiated
by victims. IED operations in response to
terror attacks fall within the purview of security forces. This is a different context than
that where civilians are threatened from enduring contamination from IEDs and that
can be addressed during humanitarian operations.

Applicability of the IMAS to Address
IEDs Today
The IMAS as they stand already cover explosive ordnance of an improvised nature.
Image 2. A selection of photos of improvised devices taken from archives of humanitarian
IEDs are included in the current nomencla- operators.
ture found in the IMAS and there are at least Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.
nine specific references to IEDs within the
Mine action operators have always carried out risk assessments
existing chapters. These references do not limit the scope of coverahead of operations, however, this process has largely been implicage of the IMAS to a certain group of IEDs, such as pressure-plate
it in SOPs or has relied on the experience from field staff. Given the
IEDs, but rather are all-encompassing.12
complexity of some of the devices found in environments such as
Key terms used by the mine action sector, such as explosive ordin Iraq and Syria, there is a real need to carry out more explicit risk
nance, landmines (in particular anti-personnel landmines), ERW
assessments.15 This is reinforced by asymmetry of many conflicts,
and its components, such as UXO and abandoned explosive ordwhere large-scale battles cease but armed actors continue to exert
nance (AXO), include improvised devices within the context of the
influence and make use of explosives to disrupt and destabilize seIMAS glossary.13,14
curity. There is a requirement to systematize the evaluation of such
Explicit and implicit references to IEDs in the IMAS have alcontexts to ensure that mine action remains focused on humanilowed programs to frame operations that concern improvised
tarian objectives and aims to uphold humanitarian principles. A
devices within the existing standards. National programs in
more formalized guidance will benefit all mine action operations—
Afghanistan, Angola, Sri Lanka, and particularly Colombia are
whether in settings that exhibit IED contamination or otherwise.
testament to this.
The IMAS place a high priority on the issue of efficiency and
Notwithstanding the framework that the IMAS provide for IEDD
the importance of targeting mine action resources appropriately.
activities, there is a significant shortfall in the explicit guidance on
In rural environments, non-technical survey helps target clearance
IEDs in the IMAS. These deficiencies in the standards have become
assets at suspected (SHA) or confirmed hazardous areas (CHA)
increasingly apparent as international attention focuses on countries
based on evidence. In addition, specific training to improve evalsuch as Iraq and Syria, where the explosive contamination, particuation skills and the ability of survey teams to accurately define
ularly in areas formally under the control of the Islamic State, insuch areas is elaborated in the IMAS. Similar guidance that targets
cludes unexploded and abandoned IEDs, in urban as well as rural
the urban environment is lacking—including methodology for ursettings. In such theaters, operators have to review skill sets of their
ban assessments, such as how to assess urban structures, take into
field staff, and national authorities are under pressure to scrutinize
account rubble (including rubble contaminated by explosive ordaccreditation procedures of organizations under their responsibility.
nance), and deal with threats of IEDs hidden in residential, occuFurthermore, donors consider value for money from a wide variety
pational, and community premises.
of proposals and look to issue grants and contracts with appropriate
reference to international norms. All such actors look to the IMAS
for guidance on IEDD, currently with only limited success.
Strengthening of the IMAS
A focus on the additional guidance necessary in current contexts,
The IMAS have been designed as evolving standards that are conincluding IEDs in the urban environment, is overdue. IEDs in these
stantly reviewed and updated to ensure that they stay relevant and
contexts increase the need for the IMAS to expand on:
applicable to the changing nature of settings where mine action ac• Sound risk assessment processes.
tivities are conducted.
• Rapid and accurate surveys.
The IMAS currently fall short in the necessary guidance to ad• Safe and efficient processes for removal and/or destruction of dress tasks concerning IEDs. As a consequence, there is mounting
explosive ordnance.
consensus from the IMAS Review Board members to suggest that
• Reaffirmation of humanitarian, rather than military, in light of the current political debates and operational demands
objectives.
there is a need to:

ISSUE 21.3 @ NOVEMBER 2017

7

Figure 3. Improvised devices cleared in Iraq by MAG between July 2016
and August 2017 (IMP – Improvised; RC – Radio Controlled; CO – Command
Operated).

Figure 4. Improvised devices cleared in Syria by MAG between July 2016
and August 2017 (IMP – Improvised; RC – Radio Controlled; CO – Command
Operated).

Figure courtesy of MAG and GICHD.

Figure courtesy of MAG and GICHD.

•

State more clearly and up front in the IMAS the applicability
of the IMAS concerning IEDs. Hence an amendment is needed to IMAS 01.10, Guide for the application of International
Mine Action (IMAS).
• Clarify selected terminology (IMAS 04.10, Glossary of mine
action terms, definitions and abbreviations) due to inconsistencies with other key sources of terminology (e.g., the major
disarmament/arms control conventions, and the UNMAS
IED Lexicon).
• Add elements of technical guidance that will assist national
authorities and operators to ensure the safety and effectiveness of work.
Other areas being considered and supported by GICHD
include:
• A greater emphasis on risk assessments and risk management
frameworks.
• A strengthening of competency levels, equipment, and training requirements.
• Further guidance within the IMAS or Technical Notes on
Mine Action (TNMA) addressing mine action in an urban
environment, especially survey and information management considerations.
It is important to recall, however, that the IMAS remain a global framework and should not dwell on specific and local contexts.
There is ample opportunity in the development of NMAS to adapt
international standards concerning IEDs to national contexts.

Summary
The IMAS have an established architecture developed over two
decades of work that has legitimacy and standing. They have been
developed for the mine action sector for operations performed in
pursuit of humanitarian objectives and in accordance with humanitarian principles, and represent the set of standards used to
promote and maintain quality during the implementation of mine
action activities.
Mine action operations are not defined by weapon type but by
the objectives they pursue and the context in which they take place.
The IMAS therefore provide the overall framework to address all
explosive ordnance, including IEDs within the boundaries of humanitarian action.
The suitability of a mine action operator to engage at a particular location or with a specific explosive device is based,
first, on the operator being clear on the humanitarian objective

Mine action operations are not defined by
weapon type, but by the objectives they pursue
and the context in which they take place.
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of the undertaking, and on it having access to humanitarian
space and, second, on the operator possessing staff with necessary skills and equipment to perform the task.
Although hundreds of thousands of IEDs, including locallymanufactured landmines, have been cleared during mine action
operations within the framework of the IMAS, the standards are in
need of being strengthened in a number of areas. These include risk
management, competency levels, training and equipment requirements, and amendments to IMAS 01.10 and IMAS 04.10 to clarify
their application to improvised devices and to address inconsistencies in the glossary of definitions. Further technical guidance including operations in an urban environment should be included in
the IMAS or a supporting TNMA.
Matters relating to IEDD operations in military and security
contexts should be elaborated outside the IMAS—whether
procedures to counter IED attacks particularly concerning vehicleor person-borne IEDs, or aspects of forensics or intelligence that
could be used to bring perpetrators to justice. All of these are
incompatible with humanitarian action and principles and do not
have space in the scope and remit of the IMAS.
There is a priority, however, to protect the integrity of the IMAS
to address all relevant explosive ordnance, including IEDs, as the
primary framework to manage operations that are humanitarian in
nature.16

See endnotes page 66
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the IMAS Review Board
nor of UNMAS, the Board's Chair.
Guy Rhodes, Ph.D.
Director of Operations
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
Guy Rhodes is responsible for the GICHD
global programming in 45 countries and manages GICHD’s three operational divisions:
Strategies and Standards, Risk Management
and Information Management; and the
Arab, Persian, French and EECCA Regional
Cooperation Programmes. Starting his career with The HALO Trust in 1993, Rhodes
has worked in the mine action sector for 24
years with 16 years of leading field operations in Africa, South
Asia, and Southeast Asia. He joined the GICHD in 2009. Rhodes is
a member of the IMAS Review Board and holds a doctorate from
Southampton University, U.K., in Earth Sciences.
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by Robert Keeley, Ph.D. [ Danish Demining Group ]

T

here is an ongoing debate about the need for standards for
improvised explosive device (IED) activities. The emergence of civilian IED response follows the development
of humanitarian mine action (HMA) in many ways. In particular,
the problems of defining contractual targets and norms were problematic in the early days of HMA, when, as for the IED response
today, money has started to change hands for services rendered.
It is the premise of this editorial that the need for humanitarian
IED (HIED) response standards derives from the contractual nature of the relationship between the client and the service provider.
Therefore, if they are to be of use, any new IED response standards
for use in the humanitarian sector must not simply rehash existing
technical military-oriented counter-IED (C-IED) procedures but
must address the problems caused by the introduction of a civilian
business model, and also take account of their relationship with
the humanitarian sphere.
Such tasks, when conducted by security forces, are managed
using what amounts to an honor system. Teams carry out work
to the best of their ability, with supervision and quality management provided through the chain of command. There are no requirements for extra, contractual stipulations as work processes
are defined by internal norms such as organizational standard
operating procedures (SOP).
However, when financial pressures are applied to services provided under contract, standard economic theory suggests that there
is an added, economic incentive to increase output at the expense
of quality. This was widely observed in the early days of HMA and
a series of process controls evolved to address this issue. Thus, the
question remains: what problems are likely to be faced in the quality management of civilian IED response, and what processes can
be used to address these problems?

Definitions and Assumptions
Firstly, it is important to take a view on the debate regarding
the definition of IED and its relationship to other terms, namely
(improvised) landmine and booby trap. For the purposes of this
editorial, it is held that these terms overlap and describe different
attributes of any particular device. The term IED refers solely to the
way an explosive device is made, and a mine is a weapon activated
by the victim. Thus, a device that is manufactured in an improvised
manner and set up to be activated by the victim is both an IED and
a mine. Similarly, given that a booby trap functions when the victim
carries out an apparently harmless act, there is considerable room
for overlap between the three terms.
Secondly, there is increasing recognition in the HMA sector that
the status of an IED is particularly relevant in determining the
technical response. The sector is discussing the use of terms like

active and legacy to describe whether or not an IED is in play or is,
in effect, an explosive remnant of war (ERW). This article uses the
following definitions:
Active device. The term active device is used to describe any IED
that is still under the effective control of the individual or group
that deployed them, or where the local populations and relevant
authorities in those locations do not wish to see them removed.
Legacy device. The term legacy device is used to describe any
IED that is no longer under the effective control of the individual or
group that deployed them, and where the local populations and relevant authorities in those locations wish to see them removed. Any
device that does not meet the definitions of a legacy device should
be considered an active device.
Thirdly, there needs to be a common understanding of what IED
response means. C-IED is commonly held to be an overarching
range of activities, including actions to:
• Attack the network (of insurgents using IEDs).
• Reduce casualties.
• Defeat the device.
• Train the capacity.
It is the assumption of this editorial that HIED response will not
attack the network but can be involved in any (or all) of the other
elements of C-IED.
Fourthly, it is also the assumption of this editorial that HIED is
as much a subset of the HMA sector as it is a subset of C-IED. Thus,
this can be visualized as a Venn diagram (see Figure 1).
Finally, these notes are written to help understand how civilian
organizations (both commercial and NGO) can contribute to HIED
activities. One issue that has become increasingly clear in recent
months is the difference between working in a humanitarian or a security environment (as illustrated in Figure 1). This is often linked in
discussions about whether or not the IED is an active or legacy device (as described previously). While there is a link between these
questions, the terms should not be used interchangeably. Rather it is
suggested that the following distinctions should be drawn:
Legacy IED. Only humanitarian considerations are relevant.
Active IED. Both HIED and C-IED approaches are relevant, depending on the requirement.
These notes are primarily intended to consider HIED under conditions where the IED is no longer considered active or in play. There is a
brief discussion at the end of this editorial about what difference an active scenario might make to contractual standards for HIED activities.

Challenges: How Much Search is Enough?
All HIED activities—and particularly search activities—
represent a need to strike a reasonable balance between
effectiveness and efficiency. One of the main differences between
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HMA
3

Mitigate human impact

4
5

7
C-IED 8

6

9

Key: Typical examples of
activities within HMA and C-IED
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Mine/area clearance
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
Mine Risk Education (MRE)
Search
IED Disposal (IEDD)
IED Risk Education (IED RE)
Force protection
Forensics
Intelligence gathering

Attack the network

Figure 1. Interrelationship between HMA and C-IED. The rugby-ball-shaped area in the center represents the HIED response subsector. Note that
humanitarian responses tend to focus on mitigating impact, whereas C-IED activities tend to focus on attacking the network. A list of examples of
typical activities in both sectors, including in the HIED subsector, are shown in the key. These activities are discussed in more detail in the text.
All graphics courtesy of the author.

IEDs and other explosive weapons is that IEDs are (almost) always
disguised. As a result, significant effort must be spent to locate the
device before disposal action can be taken. Given the range of complexity (particularly in terms of disguise) of many modern IEDs, to
always be fully effective one might have to dismantle all buildings
brick by brick to be 100 percent certain that the building does not
contain IEDs. This is akin to destroying the village in order to save
it and is, in effect, doing the enemy’s job for them. Such a comprehensive approach to search is also very inefficient as dismantling of
a building will take a search team a very long time.
On the other hand, there is potentially a perverse incentive
for civilian HIED operators to maximize efficiency (particularly
if they are paid by the number of tasks completed or the square
meterage covered) by minimizing the effort (or effectiveness) of
search activities. Without clear, contractual requirements and
norms in place, there is a risk of ‘rush to the bottom’ quality in
civilian HIED work. A similar problem was resolved in the early
days of HMA through the development of clearance norms, resulting in, for example, the need to search 100 percent of a designated area to a specific depth in area clearance, i.e., either mine
clearance or battle area clearance (BAC). Quality assurance (QA)
and quality control (QC) procedures were developed to help ensure and check that clearance was carried out to the required extent. Similar requirements can be applied to area clearance of
victim activated IEDs (VOIED) where these have been employed
as improvised mines. However, as described previously, this is
problematic in terms of other search tasks, particularly building
tasks. It begs the question: how much search is enough?
Is it a new device, or one that was missed? Another problem encountered in the early days of HMA was when a mine was subsequently found in an area declared as clear. This often resulted in
claims of re-mining even when there was no ongoing conflict. This
is likely to be a more significant problem in civilian HIED activities
given the very real risk of continued IED use by stay-behind personnel or renewed activity by insurgents. However, as in HMA, claims
of re-mining may also be a convenient excuse for poor HIED activities. The use of formal handover processes and the retention of liability for a task site helped reduce claims of re-mining in HMA.
Identifying the difference between active and legacy tasks in what
is emerging as the humanitarian IED sector has been an early step
to help ameliorate this problem, but there is still a need to consider
how to address any stay-behind IED activities in this regard.

10

EDITORIAL @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

What should be expected of HIED? A third problem addressed
in the development of the HMA sector was the need to clarify the
outputs (and hence outcomes) of various HMA activities. The development of the five HMA pillars (see Figure 2) was an early but
perhaps flawed attempt to do this.1 It was useful because it helped
explain that mine action was greater than mine clearance. It was
flawed because it mixed field operations with the advocacy elements of mine action, and specifically because it did not recognize
the key role played by mobile explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
teams in dealing with spot tasks involving unexploded ordnance
(UXO).
Subsequent work identified the three main field products of
the HMA sector as area clearance (minefield or BAC), mobile
EOD spot tasks, and mine risk education (MRE). 2 This clarification in turn helps identify the incommensurate values of these
actions: area clearance is something that produces cleared land
and does not necessarily reduce casualties, and EOD spot tasks
and MRE, which act to reduce casualties (either by removing hazards or modifying behavior) but do not act to clear areas of land.
These clarifications assist in the establishment of a Theory of
Change (ToC) for HMA by setting out the different outputs and
outcomes for the main HMA products.

Scoping HIED tasks
Defining core HIED response pillars. The core humanitarian
HIED pillars can be defined as follows:
1. Search involves all actions to locate, access, and confirm suspect IED, or to establish the absence of such devices. 3
2. IED Disposal (IEDD) includes all actions required to make
an IED permanently ineffective.4
3. IED risk education (IED RE) is an educational process intended to reduce casualties from IEDs through the modification of behavior. 5

A Theory of Change for HIED
A similar treatment needs to be done to establish the metrics of
HIED activities. Indeed, this can be considered the prime requirement to establish a quality management regime for HIED. A ToC for
typical HIED activities can be summarized as in Figure 3. Danish
Demining Group (DDG) is currently doing more work on the ToC
for HIED, including a linkage with the Sustainable Development

•

CLEARANCE. Removing and destroying landmines and explosive remnants of war, and marking or fencing off areas contaminated with them
EDUCATION. Risk education helps people understand the risks they face, identify mines and explosive remnants of war, and
learn how to stay out of harm’s way
VICTIM ASSISTANCE. Medical assistance and rehabilitation services to victims, including job-skills training and employment
opportunities
ADVOCACY. Advocating for a world free from the threat of landmines and encouraging countries to participate in international treaties and conventions
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION. Helping countries destroy their stockpiles of mines as required by international agreements

•
•
•
•

Figure 2. The HMA Pillars.1

Goals (SDG), and it is hoped that this more detailed work can be
shared soon.
Note again the incommensurate values in these different tasks.
Search tasks, like mine clearance or BAC, do not necessarily find
IEDs, thus they cannot be considered as primarily resulting in a reduction of casualties. They do however result in the release of safe
land. Similarly, IEDD and IED RE do not result in cleared land but
can be expected to reduce casualties either by the removal of hazards or by the modification of behavior (again, this is akin to conventional EOD spot tasks and MRE in the HMA sphere).
Also note that Figure 3 does not consider area clearance of
VOIED fields. As has been made clear elsewhere, VOIED employed
as improvised mines are covered adequately by existing HMA definitions and approaches, providing the appropriate equipment and
detailed, render-safe procedures are in place.

Possible Contracting Modalities and Deliverables for
HIED Activities
There are two contracting models available to address the
problems discussed in this editorial. Firstly, there is the outputbased model, as commonly used in commercial mine clearance.
This model normally uses a firm, fixed-price bidding process to
maximize efficiency. In an output-based model, service providers would be paid for the area of land cleared, normally through a
pre-defined scope of works (including specifications of the product quality) as included in the contract. This model is attractive
for clients requiring a specific area cleared to a defined depth, but
it lacks f lexibility in case of any new requirements identified during the course of the project. It is also unsuitable for spot tasks.
Output-based models are also particularly suitable for training
or RE projects where the key deliverable is the number of training recipients. The main risk with output-based contracting for

area clearance is ensuring effectiveness, i.e., that the quality of
the output meets the desired specification, but this can be addressed with appropriate quality management processes.
The second potential contracting model for HIED activities is
the service-contract model. In a service contract, the suppliers
would be contracted to provide a capacity capable of carrying out
pre-defined types of tasks for a specified period of time. Acceptable
response times can be included in the specification. Service contracts are suited to tasks that are not easily measurable in terms
of units of output, and therefore lend themselves to more complex
spot tasks such as a building search (or IEDD). Service contracts
are flexible as it allows the client to deploy the teams when and
where desired. Such contracts thus lend themselves to maximizing
effectiveness, but there is a risk of poor efficiency if the client does
not contract for the appropriate number of teams or if the teams are
slow at responding. This can be managed through use of response
time analysis and a contracting model that allows for penalizing of
poor service provision.6 The application of these two contracting
models in HIED is summarized in Figure 4.
It should be noted that it is possible to use service contracts for
area work such as area or route searches, and this may be appropriate where a number of small or otherwise unpredictable search
tasks are expected. However, there is an increased risk in lower contractual efficiency as a result. It may even be appropriate to use both
models, where large output-based search contracts allow for economies of scale, and service-contract models are used to allow for unplanned or otherwise complex tasks.
As has been discussed previously, one of the key issues in HIED
search is that, unlike for mine clearance or BAC, it is not possible
to define the scope of a building-search task in terms of 100 percent search to a defined depth. A reputable search team commander will investigate any ground sign until they are sure that there
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HIED activity

Area or
spot

Output

Outcome

Remarks

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

1

Area (rummage)
search for cache/
hides

Area

M2 searched
Cache found

Increased productive use of
safe land

Note: clearance of VOIED fields as for
HMA minefields

2

Route search

Area

Linear m/km
searched

Increased productive use of
safe route

3

Building search

Spot

Building
searched

Safe access to building

4

IED
disposal (IEDD)

Spot

IED destroyed

• Removal of hazard
• Reduction of casualties

Includes vehicle search

5

IED risk education
(IED RE)

n/a

RE given

• Modification of behavior
• Reduction of casualties

As for MRE but taking account of ‘do no
harm’ and improvised nature of devices

Figure 3. Summary Theory of Change of HIED activities, key outputs, and outcomes.
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4
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IED destroyed

Service contract

Availability of search team
in working days/years

Monitored by response
time analysis

5

IED risk education (IED RE)

RE given

Output based

Number of recipients

Figure 4. Possible contracting deliverables for HIED activities.

are no IEDs present, but the risk in a civilian scenario is where an
amoral service provider decides to maximize profit through either
expediting search quickly or by skimping on the training or other
costs of the teams. Thus, in any circumstance where the only contracting proviso is unit cost, reputable search teams will tend to
lose out to providers willing to provide a cheaper but potentially
ineffective service.

Quality Management Techniques Available for HIED
The establishment of a quality management (QM) framework for
HIED activities becomes easier now that the definitions of the activities are established, their inter-relationships are clear, and a ToC
for each activity is in place. Many of the QM techniques as set out
in Figure 5 may be familiar from HMA. Others may be additionally
appropriate for HIED actions, particularly for search. Figure 5 represents a summary of the various QM techniques. More work needs
to be done to adapt them to HIED in detail.

Quality in HIED Contract Design
As set out previously, the handover process developed in HMA
for area clearance is applicable to HIED area and route search.
However, contracts for building search may need to account for
finds after handover. This could involve the use of follow-up studies in the event of missed items to identify whether the search team
could have been expected to find the item if conducting drills properly. The assumption of legacy items will be key in this regard. It
may also be useful for such contracts to be able to cancel funding in
cases of poor technical performance. The details of contract design
will vary greatly with each funder, but it may make sense to include
a periodic progress and quality review for the purposes of continuing or cancelling contracts. One other point: it is clear that simply
going for the lowest price in the absence of contractual benchmarks
will not result in a HIED service that is fit for purpose.

Bonds, Indemnities, and Compensation
To indemnify is to compensate for loss or damage; to provide
security for financial reimbursement to an individual in case of a
specified loss incurred by the person.7
Given that a specific problem is how to ensure that HIED service
providers guarantee that enough effort is spent on a search, then it
might be appropriate to require some form of indemnity as compensation in the event that an item is missed and then either subsequently found or inadvertently detonated. This could be in the form
of a bid bond or through retaining part of the payments until after
the contract is completed. The retention of part of the payment to
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ensure quality is a common practice in the construction sector and
may be appropriate in HIED, particularly for search tasks.

Are the Problems Addressed?
Effectiveness, efficiency, and defining the scope of works. This

editorial helps to highlight the tension between effectiveness and efficiency in HIED activities, particularly during search actions. The
clarification of the outputs from different activities will help manage expectations. Whereas the products of area and route search,
and IEDD itself, can be treated much like their HMA equivalents
for the purposes of contracting, these discussions also highlight
that building-search tasks are going to be the most problematic
from a contractual point of view. Use of a service-contract model in
addition to a strong accreditation and quality management framework may be the best approach for funding a building-search capacity, with an added use of bonds or indemnities against items being
found after a search is complete. Price must not be the only criteria
for awarding HIED contracts or grants.
Re-mining or missed items. In IED response actions against
legacy items, it would appear theoretically clear that there should
be no instances of re-mining. Providing an appropriate risk assessment is completed by the contracting or tasking agency, work
should only be done in areas where there is limited risk of new, active items being used. However, it is realistic to recognize that a return of insurgent activity is likely in many areas where there has not
been some sort of comprehensive peace settlement. Thus, the use of
robust handover procedures will help mitigate the liability of the
service provider, who would not be liable for devices found or activated after the handover process, but strong QM procedures will
help ensure that the task site is not accepted unless there is sufficient
confidence that the work has been fit for purpose.
Implications for work on active tasks. One of the assumptions
made at the beginning of this editorial was that HIED work would
tend to focus on legacy tasks. However, this may not always be the
case every time civilian organizations are contracted for IED response work. Tasks may involve the full range of IED initiation
mechanisms, and there is also a much greater risk of re-mining.
The latter can be dealt with contractually through a rigorous application of the handover process, and through the maintenance of a
security cordon normally in place during C-IED operations to prevent re-entry by insurgents in the period between IED response activities and handover. The increased complexity of active devices
(in terms of their means of initiation) can similarly be addressed
by ensuring that the contracting process pays sufficient attention
to the need for training, equipment, and procedures for time- and
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Figure 5. Range of QM techniques available for HIED.

command-initiated devices used by insurgents in the country in
question at the time of the contract, implying a far more rigorous
accreditation process.
It should be clear that there is no contractual impediment for
non-profit organizations undertaking active tasks: the questions of
security and impartiality are questions for each organization to determine themselves, and should not be assumed or imposed externally. For DDG, the question of active and legacy is a key part of a
rigorous risk management process. Other organizations, including
commercial organizations, may have a different approach depending on their appetite for risk. They may also be willing to take on
other C-IED and force protection tasks that fall outside this editorial definition of HIED response.
Product definition. The third problem highlighted previously
was the need to understand what can be expected of HIED activities. This is a question of product definition and this editorial has
set out how the lessons learned from HMA can be used to formulate both a set of HIED pillars and also the outlines for a ToC for all
three of these main HIED components. It is important to note that
while conversations often focus on IEDD, the need to first locate
the device (through search) is a significant product in its own right.
Also, one must recognize that IED RE for local populations must
account for both the similarities and differences between landmines, UXO, and IEDs.

Recommendations
There is a widespread demand for HIED standards. Firstly, it is
recommended that any such standards need to focus on the contractual parameters, recognizing that the significant development
in HIED is the increased funding of civilian organizations to carry
out such work. Secondly, in order to develop contractual standards,
it should be recognized that the first step is to define the main activities carried out under HIED, and that in the humanitarian sphere

these include search and RE as well as IEDD. Thirdly, it is important
to adopt the appropriate contractual model to reflect the nature of
the activity. Fourthly, a range of quality management tools can be
adapted for use in HIED contracts once this process of product definition is in place.
This editorial does not pretend to address the complete requirement for HIED standards: much more work is needed to develop
such standards in detail. However, it is hoped that it has set out the
main areas of focus that will be needed if it is to be possible to effectively civilianize some IED response activities in the humanitarian sphere.

See endnotes page 66
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PROMOTING SECURE STOCKPILES AND
COUNTERING DIVERSION
by Eric G. Berman and Benjamin King [ Small Arms Survey ]
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Figure 1. Countries with UEMS: January 1979 to August 2017.
Courtesy of Small Arms Survey.

P

oor management of government stockpiles of small arms
and ammunition poses significant safety and security concerns—both for the country in question and often for its
neighbors. Challenges to safety are readily apparent by the frequent
occurrence and consequences of unplanned explosions at munitions sites (UEMS). Security shortcomings include oversight limitations that facilitate corrupt practices and seizures of state materiel
by armed groups that undercut a state’s legitimate use of force, and
undermine good governance and the rule of law.
The Small Arms Survey (hereafter referred to as the Survey)
actively contributes to efforts to promote physical security and
stockpile management (PSSM) and life-cycle management of
ammunition (LCMA), and works with—and benefits from—
practitioners and policy makers focusing on these agendas.1 The
development of the Survey’s UEMS-related research, for example,
was made possible in large part by the active engagement of the
Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG)
and the financial support of the Office of Weapons Removal and
Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs (PM/WRA). 2 The Survey also works closely with
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
(GICHD) in support of the Swiss Safe and Secure Management
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of Ammunition (SSMA) Initiative and other joint efforts, such as
the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affair’s (UNODA's)
SaferGuard program to promote the International Ammunition
Technical Guidelines (IATG). Survey databases and tools are
frequently used to develop national capacities and to raise
awareness among decision makers on the importance of adequately
funding and meaningfully improving PSSM and LCMA practices.

Update on Existing Tools and Reference Materials
Long-term readers of The Journal of Conventional Weapons
Destruction will remember the Survey’s efforts to develop its UEMS
Database. 3 Early data collection efforts resulted in the identification of over 400 UEMS incidents in more than 90 countries between
1979 and 2011. The UEMS Database has since evolved, both in terms
of the number of incidents entered and the additional data recorded for specific events. As of August 2017, the number of UEMS incidents since 1979 totaled 567. UEMS have occurred in (at least)
101 countries on every continent except Antarctica (see Figure 1).
The database includes fields on causation, casualties suffered, type
of site, ownership, tonnage lost, and some 50 other criteria. This
data provides a basis for analysis to allow for greater insight into
the human, financial, and political costs associated with improper

ammunition management as well as an evidence base to
support good practice.
The UEMS Database has led to the development of
two concrete tools aimed at understanding and mitigating the safety and security risks that improperly managed ammunition stockpiles pose: the UEMS Handbook
and the UEMS Incident Reporting Template (IRT). The
Survey’s 2014 UEMS Handbook, which covers the period 1979–2013, provides a comprehensive overview of
UEMS. Each incident recorded in the UEMS Database
at the time is listed by country within regions, as well as
chronologically for ease of reference. The publication also
includes the Survey’s popular PSSM Best Practice Cards
(see Figure 2), which also exist as playing cards.4 Other
features of the handbook include an analysis of these incidents’ scale and scope (e.g., their causes, numbers, and
effects), an annotated bibliography and review of various guidelines,
Figure 2. The Survey’s PSSM Best Practice Cards.
studies, and tools, and short overviews of some three dozen actors
(e.g., the U.N. bodies and agencies, regional organizations, nonUEMS, which can then better inform on the risks associated with
governmental organizations, and private companies) working to reammunition management.
duce the threat poorly-managed munitions sites and surplus amEven with existing challenges and limitations, the UEMS
munition pose to people’s safety and security. The handbook also
Database allows for important policy-relevant and agenda-setting
includes the UEMS IRT.
analyses. For instance, almost one in six incidents involve muniDespite important progress made in developing and strengthtions stockpiles owned or managed by private companies or nonening the database, data-collection challenges remain. To a large
state armed groups. This raises important questions about the
extent, the UEMS database depends on open-source informaadequacy of government oversight regarding the former, and
tion, such as media reports or other public documents. Although
about the utility of donor support to perhaps enhance some sites
a useful source of information, such documents may be limited
of the latter. Casualties suffered from explosions vary considerin terms of the amount of detail provided regarding the circumably, suggesting that while it is not possible to completely stop
stances of the UEMS incident. Official investigative reports are
incidents from happening, the implementation of good safety pracoften confidential due to potential legal liability concerns or to
tices (like those found in the IATG) can significantly reduce such
save face in light of improper ammunition management pracincidents’ ramifications.7
tices. Consequently, there is a dearth of information in open
One clear trend that defies easy analysis is the steep downturn in
source reports, resulting in a paucity of detail surrounding certhe number of UEMS recorded over the past five years (see Figure
tain UEMS incidents.
4). The rise of social media and global interconnectivity since the
In an effort to address the data gaps related to UEMS, and to prolate 1990s might partly explain the relatively small number of revide states with a framework for investigating and reporting on incorded UEMS in the 1980s. If media and donor interest in this
cidents, the Survey created the UEMS IRT (see Figure 3). This tool
phenomenon has not diminished (and if the technology to report
exists in Arabic, Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian (BCMS),
them has been constant), then the fall in the recorded number of
English, French, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Swahili. The
incidents seems genuine. What explains this? More resources?
template addresses six UEMS-related questions:
• When did the UEMS incident occur?
• Where did the UEMS incident occur?
• Who owns the site and the contents
on it?
• Why did the UEMS incident occur?
• What happened as a result of the
explosion?
• How did the state and the international community respond?
The Survey continuously updates the
UEMS Database and developed the UEMS
IRT to assist in this process. 5 The Survey
knows that this tool is in considerable demand from the more than 10,000 times it has
been downloaded from the Survey’s website.6
A challenge facing the Survey is how to ensure that this tool is fully exploited to develop national capacities and good practice. It
would also be useful to more fully generate,
collate, and verify crucial information about Figure 3. (part of) the Survey’s UEMS IRT.
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Greater expertise? Better decision making? A reduction in problematic stockpiles due to the spate of explosions
in the first decade or so of the 2000s?
Transfers and consumption of large
quantities of surplus ammunition to
meet increased demand due to the growing number of armed conflicts? The
Survey plans to address these policyrelevant questions by developing and implementing a number of related projects in
the coming years. Two illustrative examples include the LCMA Handbook and the
Making Peace Operations More Effective
(MPOME) Project.
Figure 4. UEMS by Year, January 1979 to August 2017 (data for 2017 only covers eight months).
The nine Southeast European countries
participating in the Regional Approach
to
Stockpile
Reduction
(RASR)
Initiative, which the Survey has been privileged to help support, have acknowledged
that they possess surpluses and can improve
on their current practices.8 Indeed, nearly 10 percent of the UEMS recorded since
1979 in the Survey’s database have occurred
in six of the nine RASR-participating states.
The governments have sought to mitigate
the risk of incidents by (among other things)
destroying hundreds of thousands of tons of
excess munitions. Some munitions destined
for destruction have crossed state lines for
destruction in neighboring states’ facilities,
safely and in an environmentally acceptable
manner. Experience shows, however, that
progress toward reducing surplus is not a
foregone conclusion and often occurs in fits
and starts.9 Sales remain the favored mode
of disposal for most governments, and recent unplanned explosions in that region
suggest that existing practices can still be
improved and that the need to reduce surplus remains a pressing challenge.
Governments in Southeast Europe and
Figure 5. The Survey’s PSSM Priorities Matrix.
elsewhere often lack the financial resources
to address the challenges posed by their ammunition and weapon past five years remain important elements of the Survey’s ongoing
stockpiles, and are often daunted by the legislative, logistical, and work. The Survey is committed to developing its UEMS Database
technical requirements. They often request international coopera- and utilizing its UEMS IRT more effectively. Resources permitting,
tion to address these challenges. However, the rationale for and full the intention is to provide a 2nd Edition of the UEMS Handbook in
extent of the sought-after assistance is often not well described, leav- 2019. An edition of the popular PSSM Best Practice Cards with a
ing donors unwilling to support programs and initiatives that are LCMA focus is being developed, and the RASR effort will continnot clearly explained and that do not lead to concrete outputs. To ue with new guidance from the latest RASR Workshop (held 3–4
assist states to manage their stocks and reduce their surpluses safe- October in Podgorica, Montenegro).
ly, securely, and economically, the Survey in 2016 created a PSSM
In light of the recent international shift in focus from immediate
Priorities Matrix (see Figure 5). This tool helps states prioritize their
risk reduction toward a more comprehensive approach to weapons
stockpile management needs and articulate those needs to the donor
and ammunition management, the Survey has embarked on two
community. Importantly, it moves states away from a wish list apinitiatives that merit special mention: the LCMA Handbook and
proach of asking donors for anything that might stick to a more constructive discourse. Similarly, the objective is to have donors reduce the MPOME Project.
The forthcoming LCMA Handbook is part of the Survey’s susthe likelihood for duplicating efforts.10
tained efforts toward highlighting the importance and challenges of addressing ammunition fully across its life cycle, meaning
Overview of Ongoing and Upcoming Projects
All of the previously-mentioned projects undertaken during the cradle-to-grave. Geared to non-technical audiences (especially
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Figure 6. The Survey’s LCMA Model.

decision makers and donors), the LCMA Handbook elaborates on
the aspects required for the effective incorporation of the IATG
at the national level. Indeed, one of the components of the handbook—a summary of the IATG’s more than 40 modules—will be
made available as a stand-alone output and featured on the United
Nation Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) website. As
anticipated, the full study will be published in both English and
French. As a first step, the Survey will work with MSAG, UNODA,
and other partners, to make the IATG summary available in the
four other official U.N. languages (Arabic, Chinese, Russian, and
Spanish). The centerpiece of the Handbook consists of an LCMA
Model that comprises four main elements: planning, procurement,
management, and disposal (see Figure 6). The Handbook takes advantage of a case study on the experience of
establishing an LCMA system in post-conflict
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and will incorporate examples of challenges and good practice
from across the globe.
The MPOME Project focuses on improving
management practices of small arms and ammunition within peace operations. Between
2013 and 2015, the Survey developed its Peace
Operations Data Set (PODS) that recorded
attacks on peacekeepers in numerous missions in Sudan and South Sudan, and docuFigure 7. A Survey publica- mented the loss of lethal material. In October
tion supporting the MPOME 2017, we released a study on attacks on peaceProject.
keepers not limited to missions in those two
countries, “Making a Tough Job more Difficult: Loss of Arms and
Ammunition in Peace Operations” (see Figure 7).11 The report
shows that the scale and scope of losses of contingent-owned equipment (COE) in peace operations is greater than appreciated, and
that improved practices could reduce the amount of materiel lost,
and enhance a mission’s force protection posture and its ability to
implement its mandate. The MPOME Project, which commenced in
December 2016, builds on this work; it has four components. One
concerns a series of regional workshops that will allow practitioners in peace operations to share their experiences and, in so doing,
chip away at the perceived taboo that such matters are too sensitive to discuss. A second element involves working with actors undertaking peace operations to develop countermeasures to better
manage COE as well as recovered materiel in peace operations. For

example, the Survey will work with the African
Union to develop guidelines or standard operating
procedures (SOPs) for the latter. A third component calls for the Survey to work bilaterally with
states to learn how their peace operations training
and oversight procedures have changed over the
years to better manage COE and recovered materiel, and work with them to further improve on current practice. Lastly, the MPOME Project provides
for outreach efforts to explore additional partnerships and share the results of the various initiatives
mentioned above. The initial phase of this project
runs through March 2019.
Despite the significant progress that has been
made in reducing the risk to safety and security
posed by unsafe surplus materiel and in securing
stockpiles, much more can be done. The potential
policy and programming utilities of the UEMS
Database and IRT remain underutilized. Other existing tools, such as the more recent PSSM Priorities Matrix and
forthcoming resources, including the LCMA Handbook, will be
more valuable with examples of challenges states and implementing
bodies have encountered as well as of good practice. Many countries
still view excess stockpiles as assets rather than liabilities, regardless of the conditions of their facilities and their ammunition or the
questionable market for their wares. Moreover, many countries that
would be willing to part with their excess and often aged materiel
possess neither the know-how nor the resources to act appropriately
(e.g., proper testing or improved storage). The Survey looks forward
to continuing to work with states, practitioners, and donors at national, regional, and international levels to develop and promote
tools and analyses to promote safe and secure storage and handling
of ammunition, thereby reducing illicit proliferation of lethal material and incidents of armed violence.
See endnotes pag 66
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CROSSING THE FENCE: CHALLENGES
OF OPERATIONALIZING PSSM
by Elvan Isikozlu, Matthias Krötz, and Claire Trancart [ BICC ]

P

hysical security and stockpile management (PSSM) can be
broadly defined as a series of activities that make national stockpiles of weapons and ammunition safe and secure.
Over the last decade, PSSM has become a highly requested form of
intervention to curb the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons
(SA/LW) and conventional ammunition (CA), as well as to keep
communities safe from unintended explosions. Donors have provided substantial funding for PSSM activities to countries in subSaharan Africa, where we have learned that the impact of PSSM
assistance depends a great deal on how actively improvements are
maintained.1
Maintaining PSSM improvements has to do with influencing human behavior. Organizations supporting national institutions with
PSSM are well aware of this but are often overwhelmed by immediate, tangible needs on the ground such as demands for new depots,
fencing, or training. While these activities are critical, they will easily go to waste if PSSM is not practiced on a daily basis. This article will discuss three challenges that we have observed and present
some critical questions for organizations to consider when providing PSSM assistance.

Challenge #1: Leadership of PSSM
Traditionally, PSSM falls within the purview of defense and
security institutions. However, since the Programme of Action to
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) was adopted in 2001, as well
as the entry into force of, among others, the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and
Light Weapons (2006), States Parties are mandated to establish national SA/LW commissions to advise their governments, security,
and defense forces in developing a small arms policy. 2,3 PSSM is
part of this policy and is therefore in the purview of national SA/
LW commissions. However, these commissions are often not recognized or treated as the legitimate leaders of PSSM, nor are they
given adequate authority by the top echelons of government. This
lack of clarity challenges the ability of implementing organizations
to roll out their assistance, as they may have to coordinate with
more than one national body in order to access storage facilities,
interview personnel, and/or assist in setting priorities.
Apart from which entity is the physical leader of the PSSM portfolio, there is also the question of whether this entity provides
conceptual leadership of PSSM. This has also been referred to as
national ownership of the PSSM portfolio. In some cases, strong
national leadership is overlooked by donors due to conflicting interests. However, when national leadership of this kind is missing,
it is often provided by outside organizations or donors who may
implement their own priorities for PSSM. There are a number of
reasons why national and local leadership of PSSM may be missing.
For example, these leaders may prioritize other security-related
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SA/LW records, smoke grenades, and coffee mugs are in a local armory.
The image demonstrates the lack of standard operating procedures.
All photos courtesy of Nikhil Acharya, BICC.

issues over PSSM, and some may even benefit from the status quo.
There are also practical reasons why national and local leadership
of PSSM may be missing—namely a lack of motivation and capacity to practice PSSM—to which we turn to next.
Challenge #2: Motivation to Practice PSSM
Requesting assistance for PSSM does not necessarily mean that
motivation to practice PSSM exists. Even if motivation for PSSM is
high at the top level of government, it does not automatically trickle down. Motivation needs to exist at lower levels of government
by those doing the job. It is not enough to train security service
personnel and armorers on what they should do for PSSM, they
should also be taught why. In most cases, this means understanding some of their grievances and findings ways to relay them to national leaders of PSSM. For example, some individuals working in
armories expressed frustration over the lack of career opportunities for PSSM personnel, especially given the potential health hazards and physical danger of working around decaying weapons.4
It is also important to consider whether there are motivations
to not practice PSSM. Some individuals may benefit financially
from having unregulated access to SA/LW by renting them out,
selling them on the black market, supporting poaching activities,
or committing robberies. 5 Addressing motivations against PSSM
is a significant challenge for implementers and, more importantly,
for national governments. They can be mitigated through greater
job recognition, career advancement opportunities, access to regular training, and salary increases. These qualitative and quantitative benefits can also serve as incentives to recruit and retain
PSSM personnel.

guidance, and equipment to sub-Saharan countries in particular.
Our concern is that these needs and threats will reappear if assistance does not address the less tangible, more human-oriented and
longer-term needs for PSSM. The impact of PSSM comes from how
actively any and all improvements are maintained. This means that
PSSM needs to be practiced on a daily basis and integrated into the
ongoing operations of designated institutions. It is time to reflect
on the extent to which donors and implementing organizations are
supporting these needs and hence the operationalization of PSSM.
PSSM does not occur in a vacuum. The challenges that we have
outlined in this article are also shared with the wider SA/LW and
CA management agenda. It is difficult for any donor or external
implementing agency to influence lasting change on this issue if a
country does not have a national weapons control framework in
which to legitimize and prioritize activities. There is only so much
work that can be supported and sustained from the bottom up in
the absence of top down directives and leadership. The best way
forward for donors and implementing organizations is to support
a combination of both, and to continue to reflect on the impact of
their contributions.

See endnotes page 66
A Congolese armorer locks up his armory. The note on the door and the
lock show cost-efficient measures to secure an armory.

Challenge #3: Capacity to Practice PSSM
The lack of institutional capacity to practice PSSM—and the consequent outsourcing of capacity to perform certain tasks—is another challenge to maintaining PSSM improvements over the long
term. Conflict-affected countries particularly struggle to take on
the many responsibilities of PSSM. Tasks such as drafting standard
operating procedures (SOP), organizing trainings, and coordinating armory inspections need to be assigned to a particular institution with the ability to absorb these tasks as part of their ongoing
operations. In the absence of these institutions or skilled personnel, external or seconded staff is often invited to take over some
of these tasks. The benefit of outsourcing is clear: improvements to
PSSM are made in a relatively short period of time. The disadvantage is that little of the expertise and skills necessary to operationalize PSSM are left behind.
Dealing with this challenge means considering how any type of
PSSM improvement will be operationalized before the work begins.
It means assessing what kind of managerial capacities exist within
responsible institutions and building these capacities in lieu of or in
addition to material assistance. For example, PSSM requires skills
in project management, budgeting, human resource management,
etc., none of which are specific to PSSM per se but are critical to its
practice over the long term. It also means adjusting the expectations of donors and implementers to match the realities of the local
context and not the other way around. Many institutional capacities required to meet regional and international PSSM guidelines
are limited. Rather than overburden these governments, it may be
more realistic and effective to search for localized, low-cost options
for stockpile safety and security that can be maintained and improved upon in the future.

Looking Ahead
To date, PSSM assistance has understandably focused on urgent needs and threats by providing material assistance, technical
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ACHIEVING PSSM THROUGH CIVIL
SOCIETY AND MILITARY COOPERATION
by Lee Moroney [ Golden West Humanitarian Foundation ]

T

he core focus of physical security
and stockpile management (PSSM)
is twofold: mitigate the risk of unplanned explosions at munitions sites
(UEMS) that could have drastic humanitarian consequences, and secure stockpiles
from illicit diversion and munition theft
that could fuel growing insurgencies, terrorist events, and civil conflict by state and
nonstate actors worldwide. These areas of
concern increase the risks associated with
national and regional stability. Increasing
PSSM helps professionalize a state’s military and security forces, which builds confidence and strengthens security measures
between security forces, the civilian population, and its regional neighbors.
Previously a focus area of military-tomilitary support, civil society—through
donors, international nongovernmental organizations (INGO), and international organizations—have become more involved

Typical storage conditions before reorganization within the Explosive Store House (ESH).
All photos courtesy of Golden West Humanitarian Foundation.

Inspection of ammunition in the Ammunition Processing Area: A typical condition of a propellant charge degrading over time, which results in the ammunition being unserviceable and in need of disposal.
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in directly assisting with states’ security forces in effective ammunition stockpile management processes. Cooperation between civil
society and the traditional owners of mine action (national mine
action centers) has grown over the past two decades, yet civil society’s support for a military role outside the five traditional pillars of
humanitarian mine action (HMA) is still a challenge. Cambodia is
no different in this respect, and Golden West has cooperated with
the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) for two years now in
PSSM best practice development. There continues to be support for
mitigating Cambodia’s extensive landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination, both by donors and organizations
focused on clearance and land release; however, little focus was
placed on the legacies associated with the ammunition that was
stockpiled until 2007–2009 when a German organization, Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), conducted
a project that addressed PSSM in Cambodia.
Program sustainability is necessary for PSSM programs to be
successful. While Cambodia effectively had no ammunition stockpile or lifecycle-management practices in place, GIZ conducted
training and introduced standard operating procedures (SOP).
However, these practices were not followed once the program ended. Since then, International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
(IATG) were developed in 2011 to allow for a standardized structural approach to PSSM. There are many elements to consider when
creating a sustainable program; however, long-term strategies of
support are among the most proven.

The Ammunition Processing Area, constructed with funds from the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), enables ammunition to be safely inspected in a controlled environment to enable RCAF to account for
ammunition by its condition (serviceable or unserviceable). Golden West provided training to RCAF to allow for safe inspection and conditioning of
its stockpiles.

Through the Explosive Harvesting Program (EHP) in Cambodia,
Golden West provided charges via the Explosive Harvesting
System (EHS) and was able to readdress this gap in capacity support, as Golden West was already known to the RCAF. It took time
for the interlinked and complex activities of a full, PSSM capacitydevelopment program to be accepted by the RCAF due to civil society being engaged in what is traditionally and culturally seen as
a sensitive area. When developing civil society-military relationships, trust is built over time, something that must be understood
by all stakeholders to secure a sustainable and solid PSSM program.
While the EHP program began in 2005, Golden West’s role expanded in 2015, with the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in
the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
(PM/WRA) as the donor, to consolidate already-identified, unserviceable, and surplus munitions from lesser secure storage areas into
a Central Ammunition Depot (CAD). Munitions not appropriate for
processing into charges for use by the HMA community were destroyed as part of the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) disposal operation that is integral to the EHP.
Through stockpile reduction, Golden West support evolved to incorporate the capacity development components of training, in accordance with the norms of international best practices. Refresher
training on the basic principles of munition storage and transport
was necessary, which allowed Golden West to identify the key personalities within the regional commands who would continue to be
assisted in their technical development.
In the author’s experience, this bottom-up approach is not always
appropriate. However, this first-aid fix was the most appropriate

start for the Golden West project in continuing to build trust while
simultaneously assessing the requirements and implementing elements of PSSM. This fluid strategy for project development continues to build trust and develop cooperation in what is normally
viewed by militaries as a sensitive area, as previously mentioned.
It’s all About the Approach
The sensitivity issue is something that Golden West addressed
from the start. Many within HMA are ex-military, and all participants recognized the right of a nation state to have the tools to defend its sovereignty. This includes weapons and ammunition that
militaries require to function as intended. Rather than pressuring
countries into giving civil society access to ammunition depots so
that civil society can identify unserviceable ammunition and poor
stockpile management practices, the most efficient approach is to
have countries enhance the capacity of their appropriate staff at all
levels. This results in staff who can identify and account for both
serviceable and unserviceable munitions, and allows for efficient
stockpile destruction planning. This also facilitates the cycle of disposal through efficient, munition lifecycle-management practices.
The obvious by-product of this approach is that the RCAF are
able to empirically identify and accurately account for unserviceable ammunition within military regions that they can then plan
to incorporate into a disposal plan. In Cambodia, they continue to
feed ammunition into the EHP and the country-wide HMA program with ongoing donor support.
Once up to a sustainable level, the RCAF will utilize its skill sets
in order to properly manage its inspection and proofing cycles.
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An RCAF technical officer undergoing testing on box marking identification. Correct and appropriate packaging and marking are integral
to safe storage, identification, and accountability of ammunition. The
availability of original or adequate packaging for ammunition and the
appropriate basic markings continues to be challenging in countries with
stockpiles of legacy ammunition left over from past conflicts.

Basic items such as this locally designed and produced cage pallet help
with safe movement of loose boxes of ammunition, where items such as
banding equipment are not viable in low-income countries as a sustainable solution.

Members of the Cambodian PSSM team, composed of members from the
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, the Ministry of National Defense, and
Golden West.

Ammunition will always age and become unserviceable. By
ensuring adherence to lifecycle-management principles, they will be
able to continue to reduce stockpiles of unserviceable ammunition
and increase the safety of current, serviceable stockpiles.
Benefits take time to identify at the national level, and the continual support by donors for the long-term vision is important in
supporting these principles. Civil society is well placed to provide
momentum and contribute to this movement. Once support and assistance is at an acceptable and achievable level—with the development and adoption of doctrine, policies, strategy, procedures, and a
sustainable training program and curriculum—the intent is then
that this norm will be naturally adopted as an integral and essential
part of the defense planning and budgeting. Full national ownership and a more appropriate part of the national budget can then be
allocated for adequate ammunition management practices. With
time, patience, and focus, PSSM cooperation between civil society
and militaries is achievable.
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RCAF officers conduct group work as part of the Golden West PSSM
Training in Depot Management Planning for allocating units of space for
the safe storage of ammunition in accordance with explosive limits within their buildings and depots.
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STRENGTHENING SECURITY IN MALI
WITH WEAPONS AND
AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT
by Marlène Dupouy [ United Nations Mine Action Service ]

The UNMAS contribution to weapons and ammunition management (WAM) has been innovative and holistic by combining
practical, safe storage solutions and tailor-made, on-site facility management training, complemented by in-depth trainings.
Lessons learned from working in Mali as well as input from other UNMAS WAM programs, including Côte d’Ivoire and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, led to the development of a
technical guide to improve standardization. More recently, the importance of WAM as a preventive measure against stockpile diversion has been further strengthened by Security Council resolution
2370. 2

Implementing Innovative Solutions

Figure 1. Map of Mali.
All graphics courtesy of UNMAS Mali.

W

hen insurgent groups in Mali initiated a rebellion for
independence in late 2011, the National Guard and the
Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF) in Gao
were at the forefront of hostilities, which included the pillaging of
weapons from government stores. Concurrently, the demise of the
Gaddafi regime in Libya triggered an influx of small arms and light
weapons (SA/LW) across the Sahel region and the return of fighters
from Libya, making northern Mali their base. That challenge was
quickly seized upon by jihadists and opportunists aiming to further
destabilize Mali and enlarge their bases and activities throughout
the Sahel region.
Often referred to as the real weapons of mass destruction, SA/LW
play a critical role in the perpetuation and the spread of armed conflicts. Cheap, durable, and easily concealed, SA/LW remain the primary weapons of inter-community tensions, armed insurrections,
armed rebel activities, or terrorism. The illicit proliferation, accentuated by the porous nature of borders in the region, has had a devastating effect on development, governance, and the everyday life
of communities.
Since 2013, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS),
as part of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), has been mandated
by Security Council resolution 2364 “to assist the Malian authorities with the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices and weapons and ammunition management.”1 The
resolution also “calls upon the Malian authorities, with the assistance of MINUSMA ... and international partners, to address the
issue of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and
light weapons.”1

Mali is a vast, landlocked country of more than 1.2 million sq km
(nearly .5 million sq mi). The roads connecting the south and north
are in a poor state of repair and are often targeted by armed terrorist groups in an effort to disrupt supply chains. Furthermore, the
loss of state control in northern regions for years combined with the
latest crisis has exacerbated the poor infrastructure situation.
To respond to the priorities of the MDSF in such a complex operational context, UNMAS had to develop the most flexible, fit-forpurpose, and cost-effective solutions for weapons storage in remote
areas. To reinforce the safety and security of government-owned
SA/LW, UNMAS has proposed standardized solutions for the construction of temporary storage facilities. These armories consist of
a 20 ft (6.1 m) container and offer a range of capacities from 100 to
220 weapons. Most include a separate compartment for small arms

Example of armory kit provided by UNMAS Mali Programme, 2015.
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Armory provided by UNMAS Mali Programme, 2015.

ammunition storage, with a capacity of approximately 2 metric tons
(2.2 US tons). This ready-made solution can be implemented in one
month with minimal supervision on site, thereby mitigating the risk
of failure by local contractors. Containers are prepared in Bamako
or other main cities before being transported and assembled onsite, thus limiting the risk of exposure of both local contractors and
UNMAS personnel. This temporary and mobile solution allows the
MDSF to move their storage facilities if need be. These turn-key
rehabilitation projects are easily duplicable at a relatively low cost
(USD$10,000 per unit).
To date, 22 such facilities have been constructed or rehabilitated in northern Mali, including remote locations such as Diré,
Niafunké, Goundam, and Ménaka. Additionally, to support the
MDSF while on operational deployment, armory kit solutions were
developed. The kits are composed of a container, metallic basement, mobile roof, ventilations, mobile solar panels, gun racks, unloading bays, etc., and are mobile, easily transportable, and fast to
assemble in the field with minimal skills. They are intended to ease
deployment and provide safer storage for both SA/LW and their
ammunition. They can be installed with minimal technical knowledge, skills, and means.
The team in Mali pioneered a “Technical Booklet for temporary armouries” that serves as a tool for learning and improving
the quality of design and construction of weapons storage facilities across UNMAS field programs. Following this successful initiative, the focus of the team shifted to efforts at standardizing
ammunition storage solutions. These turn-key solutions are easily
applicable by the United Nations, NGOs, or private operators that
constitute the WAM community.
Aiming to ensure sustainability through national ownership,
Malian personnel in charge of newly rehabilitated armories also
benefit from tailor-made WAM induction training. This three-day
training package is delivered on-site and is aimed at supporting the
operationalization of the armory and enhancing the capacity of the
MDSF to operate safely. The training is conducted in parallel to other qualifying WAM training in Bamako. Complementing these safe
storage initiatives, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training,
mentorship, and specialized equipment were provided to support a
national capacity to conduct bulk demolitions.
Contributing to Stabilization Efforts
Improved WAM contributed to stabilization and redeployment
efforts by enabling the MDSF to access safe SA/LW and ammunition stockpiles in areas of operation, as well as by impeding the pillaging of weapons and ammunition stocks and their deployment
during hostilities in Mali. All uniformed services deployed in remote areas—namely the MDSF, the Water and Forestry units, the

24

FEATURE @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Example of armory kit provided by UNMAS Mali Programme, 2015.

Customs and the Penitentiary Administration—have benefited
from such support. Among them, the National Guard is the most
decentralized service and often targeted by terrorist attacks across
the country. The National Guard plays a critical role in the redeployment of state authority in the most remote areas with direct
contact with local populations. The rehabilitation of weapons and
ammunition storage areas in central and northern Mali, as well as
the provision of trainings, contribute to the return of state authority
in these areas by strengthening the capacity of state institutions—
in this case Malian Defense and Security Forces to securely store
their weaponry. In addition, it helps to foster the conditions that are
necessary for the redeployment of MDSF in central and northern
Mali. UNMAS has supported this security force with the rehabilitation of armories in Gao, Ménaka, and soon-to-be Gossi, as well as
with the delivery of various WAM induction trainings that enable
the National Guard to be operational and to prevent looting of national stockpiles.
When interviewed on 7 August 2017, the commanding officer of
the National Guard in Gao highlighted that UNMAS assistance
helped to support stabilization efforts and that a positive impact
was noticed on the ground. He emphasized that the WAM trainings
contribute to raising awareness of personnel on the importance of
applying best practices in order to avoid stockpile diversion and accidents. Moreover, he stressed the significant impact of implementing rehabilitation projects in rural areas as a positive signal for local
administrations and populations and a significant contribution to
stabilization efforts in Mali.

See endnotes page 66
Marlène Dupouy
Capacity Development Advisor
UNMAS Mali Programme
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SPOTLIGHT:
Clearing Landmines and
Building Peace in Colombia
In the

by Vanessa Finson [ Norwegian People’s Aid ] and Giovanni Diffidenti [ Photographer ]

I

n 2015, the government of Colombia and las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarais de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo
(FARC-EP) invited Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), to develop a joint pilot project to survey and clear antipersonnel mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). The project was a first of its kind in terms of the com-

position of the teams: two warring parties working side-by-side, and a means to help build trust and de-escalate
the conflict during the Colombian peace process. In 2016, NPA commissioned photojournalist Giovanni Diffidenti
to visit Santa Helena and El Orejón to capture the historic demining project in action. Diffidenti’s photos for NPA
are featured in this article.
In 2016, the government of Colombia and FARC-EP reached a peace agreement after four years of negotiations. The
agreement ended one of the longest armed conflicts in South American history, and Colombian President Juan Manuel
Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo in December 2016.
More than 50 years of civil war has left Colombia with widespread landmine and ERW contamination. Clearing the
country of landmines is an important pre-condition for the fulfillment of the peace agreement and a successful transition into post-conflict Colombia. It is also an obligation under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), to
which Colombia is a state party and is required to complete landmine clearance by its Article 5 treaty deadline of
1 March 2021.
Two BIDES members walk through an area cleared of landmines in Alto Capitan (2016).
Photo courtesy of Department of Antioquia.
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DAICMA’s Paulo Lasso conducts MRE in Santa Helena primary school, and shows children a video in which they can see landmines and hear stories
of landmine survivors (2016).
Photo courtesy of Department of Meta.

Landmines are dispersed throughout an estimated 40

The pilot project also encouraged both parties to work

percent of the national territory. More than 11,000 vic-

together to achieve a specific goal: clear landmines that

tims of landmines have been recorded since 1990.1 Due to

endangered the population.

the conflict, the Colombian population has suffered large-

NPA’s role in the successful implementation of the

scale displacement, and the government has registered

pilot project consisted of three elements: a reference

more than 7.2 million internally displaced persons (IDP).

group comprised of one peace negotiator from the gov-

Demining operations are essential for reducing the fear

ernment, one member from FARC-EP, and one NPA rep-

and risk of mine- and ERW-related incidents, and for mak-

resentative; a steering group with members from all

ing land available for safe and productive use (e.g., farm-

three parties; and a management field team in charge of

ing and other livelihoods), promoting development, and

implementing the project.

restoring access to infrastructure and public services.
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The geographical areas chosen for clearance opera-

NPA led, coordinated, and facilitated the demining pilot

tions were two highly contaminated areas of Colombia

project from May 2015 to December 2016. The demining

that had not seen any humanitarian demining previ-

teams consisted of personnel from both the Government’s

ously. Santa Helena in the Department of Meta is sit-

Demining Engineers Battalion (BIDES) and FARC-EP, ac-

uated in a flat area with heavy rainforest vegetation.

companied by the Colombian National Authority on Mine

Parts of this area were difficult to access because

Action, Dirección para la Acción Integral contra Minas

the roads were heavily damaged. The other area, El

Antipersonal (DAICMA). Part of NPA’s role in Colombia

Orejon, is situated in the Department of Antioquia.

during the peace process was to build trust between the

It is a mountainous area with rivers and high rainfall,

parties. NPA organized trust-building activities, such as

and difficult weather conditions frequently stopped

football tournaments and barbeques. BIDES and FARC-EP

the operations. Both communities are in need of socio-

lived under the same roof during the pilot project, which

economic development, including the construction of

meant they got to know one another well and had con-

roads, and improvements to health services and ed-

versations that were not limited to work-related issues.

ucation. The pilot project contributed by removing
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landmines, constructing a community house, and making improvements
to a local road and bridge.
During the pilot project, NPA
found 66 landmines and one item
of

unexploded

ordnance

(UXO).

Another essential part of the project was to conduct MRE in coordination with DAICMA. NPA also trained
four members from different villages who undertook MRE for their own
communities.
In a war-torn country where support for the peace process has
Cattle handlers pass next to a minefield in the Gilotambor task area, Santa Helena (2016).
Photo courtesy of Department of Meta.

been low among the civilian population,

the

trust-building

exer-

cise between parties showcased
positive results, and provided significant political and peacebuilding dividends. On 23 June 2016,
the

Colombian

government

and

FARC-EP signed a historic bilateral
ceasefire deal. The two parties formally signed a peace agreement on
26 September, but the deal was subsequently rejected by a narrow margin in a referendum on 2 October
2016. A revised peace accord was
signed 24 November and ratified by
Congress from 29 to 30 November
NPA dog handlers Measho Kidanemariam and Mohamed Beyele Shikuralahi with their mine detection dogs Rambo and Hamilton, deployed on long leash searching in a minefield in the Filotambor
area, Santa Helena (2016).
Photo courtesy of Meta.

2016. On 27 June 2017, FARC-EP
ceased to be an armed group, disarmed, and turned over more than
7,000 weapons to the United Nations
at a ceremony in Mesetas.
Following the pilot project, NPA
obtained full accreditation and registered as a clearance organization in
Colombia. In April 2017, NPA started
its own operations in Vista Hermosa,
a municipality in the Department of
Meta. NPA teams have conducted
non-technical survey and clearance
in Mesetas, also in the Department
of Meta.
NPA

FARC-EP’s Jefferson Martinez points out to BIDES an area where they might find more landmines
in the CHIRI 4 minefield task (2016).
Photo courtesy of Department of Antioquia.

is

assisting

DAICMA

and

FARC-EP in their mine action efforts.
NPA has provided DAICMA with an
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Above: Inside her tent, a light bulb illuminates FARC-EP’s Lilana Castellano and FARCEP Commander Alfonso Cano (2016). Castellano
comes from META, part of the Bloque Oriental
military group and joined FARC-EP at the age
of 15. “I entered FARC because I did not have
the opportunity to study or to work. We don’t
have any discrimination in our party (of women, men, black people or whatsoever),” says
Castellano. She was a commander of a mobile
campaign. “We always thought of peace since
the beginning of war. There is lots to do, and I
will follow the orders of my party.” The party,
for Castellano, is everything—family, friends—
and gives her a sense of security. She traveled
to Havana and saw the sea for the first time.
“The sensation of the sand and the sea under
my feet … I ran for three [kilometers], a sensation of freedom.”
Photo courtesy of Department of Meta.

Left: Alejandro Hernandes holds a photo of
himself with his wife Yudi Garcia and their son
Miguel Angel Hernandez in El Orejon (2016).
Yudi died in a landmine accident not far from
their home—she was 16 years old.
Photo courtesy of Department of Antioquia.
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FARC-EP, BIDES-DAICMA, and members of the local community play football on the school grounds in El Orejon (2016).
Photo courtesy of Antioquia.

information-management adviser who will help enhance

Humanicemos. Moreover, NPA collaborates closely with

systems

the

the national military humanitarian demining brigade on

information-management team with the national authori-

various topics, particularly on the training and accredita-

ties. NPA is also assisting FARC-EP in structuring its

tion of mine detection dogs in Colombia.

and

undertake

capacity

building

of

See endnotes page 66

recently established organization for mine action,
Vanessa Finson
Norwegian People’s Aid
Country Director, Colombia

Giovanni Diffidenti
Photographer
www.giovannidiffidenti.com
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Field Notes
Humanitarian Mine Action
and IEDs
by Craig McInally and Hans Risser [ Norwegian People’s Aid ]

N

orwegian People’s Aid (NPA) has been operational
in improvised explosive device (IED) clearance in
Hamdaniya, Iraq, since January 2017. Additionally,

MAG (Mines Advisory Group) has operated in the same area
clearing IEDs since September 2015 and has had operations
in many parts of both Iraq and Syria. Other nongovernmental organizations (NGO) clearing IEDs include Handicap
International and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
(FSD). Without question, IED clearance is now an established
part of humanitarian mine action (HMA). Yet this does not
mean HMA should adopt the full spectrum of IED disposal (IEDD) operations. Rather, NGOs can provide invaluable
capacity only within the appropriate humanitarian context.

IEDs on the Battlefield

IEDs have long been a part of the battlefield mix of explo-

sive hazards, from simple, modified munitions to complex,
multi-switch devices. In conflicts, these devices are typically neutralized by specialized military and/or police teams.
However, not every device is found, so IEDs inevitably end up
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This kerosene heater was modified into an IED that incorporates both a
crush necklace and a built-in, anti-lift feature. These devices and others
like them are sitting among the rubble inside abandoned homes awaiting returning families.
All photos courtesy of NPA.

IED Proliferation in Iraq and Syria

IED deployment methodologies changed dramatically

as a part of the explosive contamination left behind after the

when ISIS broke out of Syria and swept through a massive

shooting stops. Consequently, HMA actors have a long his-

swath of Iraq in 2014. IEDs became a main strategic tool in

tory of dealing with booby-trap scenarios involving modified

both offense and defense. Using captured factories and ma-

munitions, such as in the Balkans, or abandoned IEDs, such

chinery, ISIS began making improvised landmines, rockets,

as in southern Afghanistan. This was generally executed as

mortars, fuses, and grenades—some of which are complete

incidental encounters during unexploded ordnance (UXO) or

one-off designs—while others are surprisingly decent copies

mine clearance but not the main effort. However, the battle-

of state-produced munitions. The sheer scale and variety of

field is evolving, and HMA must grow with it.

IED production and deployment is astounding.

The successes of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

Arguably the most popular design with ISIS is the pressure-

(APMBC) and munition stockpile reduction projects have

plate IED (PPIED). Although it looks nothing like a mine, it

limited the availability of these weapons to nonstate actors.

is commonly deployed with the same tactical intent as a tra-

In the beginning of the insurgency campaigns in Afghanistan

ditional mine.

and Iraq, IEDs tended to use main charges of unexploded pro-

The PPIED consists of two plates held apart by spacers.

jectiles or other factory-produced ordnance. When the stock

When these plates touch from pressure, the circuit is closed,

of munitions ran out, the bomb makers turned to homemade

firing an electric detonator. The detonator can be commercial

explosive (HME) for main charges. By manufacturing HME

or also improvised. Certainly this is a very simple yet effec-

from common precursors such as aluminum, urea, ammo-

tive device. The main charges are made from just about any

nium nitrate, and potassium chlorate, the bombers created a

available container from fuel jugs to tea kettles, or they can

nearly inexhaustible supply chain.

be made by ISIS from industrial pipes, gas cylinders, or other
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The rubble from an adjacent IED detonation makes the crush necklace
even harder to see.

assault from security forces. Command IEDs can be found interspersed at key points inside the protective row as well.
An anti-personnel mine, as defined by the APMBC and
the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended
Protocol II, is “a munition designed to be placed under, on or
A typical PPIED with dual pressure plates. The national staff searchers
have marked it for the IED specialists to prosecute.

near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by
the presence, proximity or contact of a person” intended to
“incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”1,2 The treaty definitions say nothing about the munitions being factory made, meaning a victim-operated (VOIED) placed on the
ground or another surface area is an anti-personnel mine under the scope of these definitions, their respective treaties and
international humanitarian law.
Another common tactic is to place IEDs inside houses in
the perimeter of the village and in large defensible structures
such as schools and hospitals. Some of these IEDs are well disguised as seemingly harmless objects. NPA has encountered
generators and kerosene heaters repurposed as VOIEDs in

The same PPIED after neutralization. Note the square, white electronic
anti-lift device on the left.

several houses. The primary switching is small contact beads

repurposed material. Typical net explosive quantity (NEQ)

pressure plates in a row. The commonly used name for this de-

ranges from 6 to 20 kg (13 to 44 lbs), although much larger

sign is crush necklace (although many other names are used).

charges have been found when targeting vehicles. Secondary

These crush necklaces can be several meters long and snake

anti-lift features are common, as are dual pressure plates. If on

around doors and stairways.

the surface, even a child’s footstep is enough pressure to function the device.

at intervals of fine copper wire, essentially multiple miniature

The wires are usually enameled or painted to match concrete and are hard to see. So far, every device of this category

Yet the charges are powerful enough to destroy a truck and

that NPA neutralized has also contained at least one second-

kill the occupants. PPIEDs currently encountered in Iraq are

ary switch targeting the clearance agent. Crush necklaces are

generally robust in design and can remain functional for several

also found with other types of main charges. When deployed

years. Other improvised mines, which mimic factory-produced

on hard surfaces, the target is personnel, and on soft ground,

mines in form as well as function, use mechanical cocked-

the target is vehicles.

striker fuzing, and these may have even longer operational

Security forces conducted clearance as they breached

lifespans than electronically-fired systems. ISIS deploys these

through, but the quality of the clearance is not to interna-

improvised mines in long, patterned rows to defend against

tional standards and the mapping is nonexistent. The vast
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majority of devices remain in situ, especially the massive rows
of improvised mines. The precise amount of contamination is

IED that is at play within the active battlefield, humanitar-

not known, but a reasonable estimate is that over 50 percent

ian intervention is inappropriate because it would raise ques-

of communities in the areas liberated from ISIS in Iraq have

tions regarding the humanitarian principles of neutrality and

large-scale IED contamination. While the original target was

impartiality. This is not specific to an IED context but equal-

security forces, today the victims of these IEDs are the dis-

ly applies to a classic minefield. A humanitarian mine ac-

placed people who are returning home to rebuild their lives.

tion operator would never enter into a conflict zone to clear

Humanitarian Response

a minefield that one side of the conflict is actively defending
or maintaining.

The humanitarian crisis created by these IEDs is hard to

Therefore, if there was ongoing IED deployment or over-

fully comprehend. A massive swath of Iraq and Syria was laid

watch in an area, it would be inappropriate for a humanitar-

waste and booby-trapped. IEDs lurk among the rubble, along

ian operator to intervene as it could, in legal terms, potentially

roads and power lines, inside abandoned houses and govern-

constitute direct participation in the conflict.

ment buildings, and in agricultural fields.
Some groups within the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
and mine action community have questioned the capability of

The HMA Role in IED Clearance

For HMA, the most appropriate environment for opera-

HMA NGOs to clear IEDs. While some of this is an obvious

tions is post-conflict or in a theater where active combat is

ploy to corner the market, the question is nevertheless valid

not taking place. This allows HMA to focus on giving support

and should be discussed openly. Whether NGOs can conduct

to those who are most vulnerable and meeting the needs of

IED clearance effectively has been proven on the ground al-

the civilian population and returnees. Thus, HMA focuses on

ready. So perhaps the correct discussion is how and why we

three main types of clearance with respect to IEDs: hazardous

are operating. The discussion begins by acknowledging two

areas, booby-trapped structures, and spot tasks.

crucial differences in NGO capacity versus security forces and
commercial companies.

Hazardous areas of VOIEDs are improvised minefields,
and HMA NGOs are the leading actors in mine clearance and

First, HMA NGOs are impartial and not in the fight.

its associated survey and information management (IM). By

HMA deployment is non-tactical and engages directly with

adapting current best practices in mine clearance, operators

the affected community. The teams are neither intended nor

can efficiently locate and remove the devices and return the

equipped to deploy full security cordons or engage defensive-

resource back to the community. Like traditional mine clear-

ly. Deployment is planned in areas far enough away from the

ance, most of the effort is expended in identifying the areas

frontline to reduce the probability of being targeted or being

and searching for the devices.

caught in an engagement.

Unlike traditional mine clearance, the improvised nature of

Second, NGOs do not use armor, electronic counter mea-

the threat requires IEDD-qualified staff to deal with even the

sures (ECM), fully remote procedures, and security cordons.

most apparently simple device. NGOs and commercial com-

Thus active command or time devices fall outside the scope of

panies both employ former military personnel to provide this

HMA work. NPA applies a sufficient soak time (period of time

capacity. HMA must be vigilant in keeping improvised mine

observed in order to allow active sensors to run down and

clearance procedures distinct from traditional mine clear-

timers to expire) to ensure that any lingering fighters have left

ance. Like all mine or UXO clearance, the skills of the team

and that any active timers or power sources have run down.

and equipment required must be adjusted to the threat posed

The remaining devices are then considered to be abandoned

by the devices.

IED and fall into the HMA realm.
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for a humanitarian operator. If the clearance task involves an

Structure clearance is done solely by IED-qualified staff.

But perhaps even more important than how an HMA NGO

High Risk Search techniques created by military IED opera-

deploys in a C-IED role is why. As defined in International

tors are employed, but the tools and methods are compara-

Mine Action Standards (IMAS), HMA projects “should re-

tively low-tech versus proper military teams. Also, given that

flect fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality,

the intent of HMA is to return land and property back to civil-

impartiality, equality and humanity so that mine action is fo-

ian use, protection of property is even more important with-

cused on giving support to those who are most vulnerable”

in the HMA context, so energetic attacks (disruptors, various

(IMAS 1.10).2 If operators are going to continue to conduct

water explosives, shaped charges, etc.) are less commonly

HMA, the real question is which C-IED tasks are appropriate

used. Buildings are selected based on the resource value to the
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Where HMA stands out is in the long grind of survey and
clearance. HMA developed the land release and toolbox concepts. Land release is a process that coordinates certain types
of survey with clearance and puts the emphasis on survey over
clearance in order to get hazard areas released efficiently and
safely (see IMAS 07.11 for more).
The toolbox concept is a strategy for utilizing mechanical,
manual, and animal systems together to optimize quality and
productivity. Survey of the region and clearance of hazardous
areas is a slow process even in the best conditions. Time is on
the side of NGOs. Taking on the large, complex area clearance
tasks frees up clearance teams from security forces to get back
A row of improvised mines isolated for clearance.

in the fight and do what they do best.

community. For example, NPA has cleared several homes for

Beyond survey and clearance, HMA activities include risk

returnees as well as a large primary school and a large second-

education and community liaison work that have positive in-

ary school in an area 20 km (12 mi) from Mosul.

direct effects on clearance. NGOs train local teams who, in

For HMA, the results are all about the human impact, not

turn, teach local people how to recognize, avoid, and report

just square meters. Spot tasks have changed as well. Before

hazards. The obvious benefit is saved lives. But local reporting

the IED proliferation, an unfired round of ammunition was

also provides a massive boost in information collection and

simply picked up and hauled off. Now in countries such as

task prioritization. Further, NGOs gain community accep-

Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, or Somalia, the same item

tance that can also have security benefits on the ground, par-

must now be evaluated as a potential come-on or IED com-

ticularly in countries that are suspicious of foreign people and

ponent. Further, abandoned command or time devices pop up

organizations.

as spot tasks here and there. These are essentially then treated
as VOIED in case of secondary switching (with some exceptions such as stuck-fast timer). Of course, drills such as Radio
Frequency discipline or wire control are still employed—just
without the worry of an active triggerman or a running timer.

Comparative Strengths and Weaknesses

Security forces, commercial companies, and NGOs each

have a different role to play in the effort to remove explosive
hazards. In some cases, NGOs are not suitable at all. In other cases, NGOs are the best equipped to deliver a solution. In
fact, NPA proposes that the three sectors of IED response,
when working together and sharing information, can achieve
synergy. What is important is to understand our various roles.
As previously mentioned, NGOs cannot, or at least should
not, do front-line clearance or active command or time devices. These scenarios are appropriate for security forces and certain specialized commercial companies.
IED operators take years to develop from scratch, so fast
response requires a large amount of expat skill sets imported
to the mission, and commercial companies can more easily
recruit these operators due to more lucrative compensation.
NGOs are unlikely to win funding for clearance of private
commercial property or military bases, whereas commercial
companies are well suited for these tasks.

This primary school classroom bears the marking from the HRS clearance process.
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and professionally-manufactured munitions available to insurgent groups appears to be a long-term trend that is here to
stay. Without the open backing of a foreign government, the
insurgents’ most likely weapon in the future will continue to
be improvised devices.
NPA and other NGOs have clearly demonstrated that
HMA actors can play a role in IED clearance operations within the appropriate humanitarian context. The question is not
whether HMA actors can address active command or timed
devices, but whether it is appropriate given their humanitarBeneficiaries of NGO clearance. These children can now return to school
after more than two years without formal education.

Based on the authors' experience in the commercial and
HMA sectors, NGOs are far more cost-effective than forprofit companies. Because NGOs operate at lower costs, and
because they actively work to build self-sustaining national capacity, the value per dollar and sustainability are much better.
However, highly-capitalized commercial companies are more
agile in initial deployment and redeployment than NGOs.

ian mandate. HMA NGOs can always adjust their capacity to
respond appropriately to the threat posed by a device. The
question of where an HMA actor can or cannot operate is not
determined by the type of device but by the scenario in which
the device is found in. Once the conflict is over, NGOs can
move in and devote the months or years needed to return resources back to the communities as part of regaining normalcy after war.
A version of this article first appeared in the Counter-IED
Report, Autumn 2017.
See endnotes page 66

Quality management (QM) in HMA and commercial companies is extremely stringent. There are several tiers of internal
QM, and generally the National Mine Action Authority or the
United Nations Mine Action Service provides external QM.
Security forces, on the other hand, do not have the time or resources to devote to clearance at these high standards.
The final strength of the NGO in this crisis is the value of
the clearance to the community. NPA’s mandate is to restore
access, both directly to the people and to aid agencies trying
to deliver assistance. Other NGOs have similar approaches
that focus on how the IEDs impact communities in order to
prioritize assistance with limited resources.

Looking Forward

HMA actors have been clearing improvised devices and

Craig McInally
Operations Manager
Norwegian People’s Aid
Craig McInally is the Operations Manager for
Norwegian People’s Aid in Northern Iraq. He
started in the U.S. Army first as infantry,
then later joined EOD and served as a Team
Leader. McInally has since been employed
in both the commercial and humanitarian
sectors of the explosive ordnance career
field for the past 17 years in various locations
including Afghanistan, Colombia, El Salvador, and Libya. He holds
a bachelor's degree in Management, a master's degree, and is a
member of the Institute of Explosive Engineers.

conducting house clearance of booby traps for years. We
continue to clear minefields with complex threats including
anti-lift devices, tripwires, or mixes of UXO, landmines, cluster strikes, and improvised landmines. In each specific task,
HMA organizations must analyze the threats and adjust their
training, equipment, and skill set to meet the threat posed by
the mix of devices in each location. In this sense, dealing with
IEDs and improvised landmines is nothing new for HMA actors. What has changed in places like Iraq and Syria is the
scale of the use of IEDs versus traditional factory-produced
munitions. Due to the success of the APMBC and government
efforts to improve physical security and stockpile reduction
projects, the dwindling supply of anti-personnel landmines
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Hans Risser
Global Head of Operations
Norwegian People’s Aid
Hans Risser is Global Head of Operations for
Norwegian People’s Aid and is based in Oslo,
Norway. From 2004 to 2016, he served as a
United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) project manager and technical
advisor for a variety of projects in Small Arms
Control, Mine Action and Armed Violence
Reduction both in UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis
Prevention and Recovery in Geneva and several field posts in South
Eastern Europe and Africa. He holds a MA in International Policy
Studies from the Monterey Institute for International Studies and a
bachelor's degree in Foreign Service from Georgetown University in
Washington, D.C.

Field Notes
Recovering The Past:
A Photographic Documentary
Exploring Post-Conflict Reconciliation
by Ian Alderman

DOVO-SEDEE personnel (on the right) wears a biochemical protection suit to handle and dismantle recovered toxic ordnance. Although the gas shells
are a century old, their contents have lost none of their toxicity. The Australians in this image carry box respirators, essential for survival in trench
warfare.
Photo courtesy of the author.

O

n 11 November 1918, the Armistice brought an end

In 1920, in Flanders, Belgium, a Poelkapelle-based bomb

to the First World War. With the guns falling silent,

disposal company began the task of clearing the unexploded

the armies disbanded and peace once again reigned

ammunition from in and around the former Ypres Salient.

over a European landscape, destroyed through years of

Initially it was expected that the operation would be completed

industrial-scale conflict. The Armistice also heralded the start

within three years; however, this was not to be the case. In

of two significant major operations: the unenviable task of ex-

2015, from Flanders’ former First World War battlefields,

huming human remains from the battlefields for reburial in

DOVO-SEDEE, the Belgian army’s bomb disposal unit,

the hundreds of newly created cemeteries, and the collec-

collected 173.4 metric tons (191 short tons) of ammunition

tion and controlled destruction of the millions of unexploded

comprising 8,690 projectiles, of which 1,018 included (or

shells that littered the former battlefields.

contained) toxic contents. In 2016, the figure rose to
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The construction of new buildings or road developments carries a particularly high risk to building contractors. Construction sites in Flanders will occasionally employ civilian-contracted detection companies to identify and manage the inevitable unearthing of unexploded ammunition until its recovery by personnel of DOVO-SEDEE. The construction site in this image is in Ypres. Nine Victoria Crosses were awarded to the men of the Australian
Imperial force for their gallantry in the battles that raged around this town in 1917.
Photo courtesy of the author.

197.7 metric tons (217.9 short tons) of ammunition, comprising

A strong set of photographs will always be enhanced if ac-

7,767 projectiles, of which 838 had toxic contents. The bomb

companied by a strong or original narrative. It was whol-

disposal operation in Flanders continues on a daily basis, a

ly probable that a great many projects inspired by the First

century after the last of hundreds of thousands of traumatized

World War were simultaneously under production at that

men left the trenches for the final time to return home.

time so originality was a critical consideration. Despite a fam-

I am a London-based photographer whose great

ily connection, as I indulged my personal interest in the war

grandfather was shot at the Battle of the Somme in 1916. With

itself, a broader message kept emerging, a message that tran-

this family history and the then fast-approaching centenary

scended that particular war and clearly applied to all conflicts

commemorations of the First World War in mind, in 2011 I

past, present, and in all likelihood, the future. I decided to fo-

embarked on developing a complex but unique photographic

cus my project around the theme of post-conflict reconcilia-

project to be entitled Recovering The Past. Since its comple-

tion. Recovering The Past was subsequently born.

tion, Recovering The Past has been exhibited both at the

The consequences of war are many, some obvious, others

United Nations in Geneva and currently as a component of

less so, and often remain with us for many years. Recovering

the centenary commemorations to the Battle of Passchendaele

The Past is a project that brings together two separate groups

at the In Flanders Fields Museum, in Ypres, Belgium, as part

of men with origins a century apart, but who are united

of the Total War display.

through conflict. Each of the two stories combined within

We thought we managed alright, kept the awful things out of mind, but now
I’m an old man and they come out from where I hid them. Every night.
-Jim McPhee from Drouin, Victoria,
a veteran of the Western Front1
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Crate Number 143 of Great War vintage ammunition awaits its destruction. Recovered from Flanders former battlefields, it is a sobering indication
of the scale of the problem. Each shell is bar-coded primarily for the purpose of traceability through the complex disposal process. Another advantage of this system is that it allows the creation of a database of all types of ammunition recovered on the battlefield. The chalk circle indicates the
filling point of the shells’ chemical contents during its manufacture.
Photo courtesy of the author.

The unexploded ammunition’s location will have been given to DOVO-SEDEE for its collection by the local police who will have verified the shell’s existence beforehand. A first reconnaissance will be made by the police who will provide additional information on the type and size of the unearthed
ammunition. This facilitates the intervention of the DOVO-SEDEE team. The highest percentage of ammunition recovered originates from farming
and commercial development.
Photo courtesy of the author.
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An eight-inch British high-explosive shell is recovered from drainage works undertaken in the back garden of a house in modern day Passchendaele.
For the residents of Flanders, more specifically in the Southwest, such finds are commonplace.
Photo courtesy of the author.

Two members of DOVO-SEDEE’s bomb disposal team carry unexploded ammunition from its point of recovery to their vehicle. Twice a day DOVOSEDEE will bury and detonate conventional high-explosive ammunition recovered from around the former Ypres Salient. On average, DOVO-SEDEE
will destroy circa 100 tonnes of ammunition by closed-earth detonation per year.
Photo courtesy of the author.
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In adopting both Hurley’s use of
composite imagery and Longstaff’s artistic depiction of soldiers, the artistic
inspiration of Recovering The Past is
based on elements of Australia’s artistic
and cultural heritage.
Having secured the necessary authorizations from DOVO-SEDEE in 2011 to
embark on this project, I made frequent
trips to Flanders over a period of several years to produce the project’s master
images. I accompanied the personnel
of DOVO-SEDEE on over one hunThe final image of "Recovering the Past" sees the project’s narrative reversed; as such it is a
powerful statement of what lies ahead. Unexploded ammunition is not a problem unique to the
former battlefields of The Great War. All conflicts since, and those to come, will leave a similar
tangible and lethal legacy for future generations to confront. "Recovering the Past" encourages
its viewer to consider this troubling consequence of human conflict and stands as an opportunity
on which it can be debated.
Photo courtesy of the author.

dred call-outs to recover ammunition
unearthed by members of the public
in their gardens, and more commonly
from farming or construction activities.
Months of experimental preproduction work were spent developing a work-

each image symbolically represent a unique consequence of

flow that enabled me to produce the photographs I needed of

human conflict.

DOVO-SEDEE’s operations so that cohesive montages could

The project’s 25 images are a montage of my own photo-

be later produced. Once embedded with the bomb disposal

graphs of the operations of the DOVO-SEDEE bomb disposal

team, it was crucial that I could take the required photographs

team, and archival images of men of the Australian Imperial

in as short a time as possible at multiple locations, while caus-

Force (AIF). The men of the AIF made significant contribu-

ing minimal disruptions to the bomb disposal operations.

tions to the fighting in many localized battles that collectively

The technical challenges to be solved with produc-

made up the Third Battle of Ypres. Their courageous efforts

ing Recovering The Past were many and often frustrating.

are acknowledged through the images of this project.

Attempting seamless integration of an old image into new

2

An important inspiration came from two prominent

soon proved unsatisfactory. It became apparent that the only

Australian artists. Captain James Francis “Frank” Hurley

way to sensitively combine such images was to integrate the

took powerful images during the Third Battle of Ypres; they

new around the old. The photographic data inherent in the ar-

convey the atrocious fighting conditions endured by those

chival component can be matched or reproduced within a new

who fought in that battle. But for Hurley, individual images

image; it is not possible to do the reverse. Camera height, cam-

failed to capture the scale of the event, consequently he pro-

era angle, direction of light—all highly significant technical

duced several (now famed) composite images from his own

considerations can be established from analyzing an archival

negatives, which portray the battle as he himself saw it. “It

picture. This crucial data must be matched and ultimately in-

is impossible to secure full effects of this bloody war without

corporated into the new photograph while on location and all

composite pictures. It’s unfair to our soldiers,” wrote Hurley.3

in a space of a few minutes. Patience proved essential.

Australian artist Will Longstaff produced the celebrat-

The integration of the Australian men in the images is not

ed painting ‘Menin Gate at Midnight’ after attending the

merely one of technical correctness; it is critical to generate an

gate’s official opening in July 1927. Situated in Ypres, the gate

all-important emotional connection, too. They must be made

bears the names of 54,896 men whose remains have nev-

to engage with either an event in the contemporary photo-

er been found. Longstaff’s painting depicts the spirits of the

graph or with the viewer themselves. Achieving this was the

Australian dead rising from the ground.

most challenging aspect of the production phase.

It is impossible to secure full effects of this bloody war
without composite pictures. It’s unfair to our soldiers.
-Captain Francis Hurley 3
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Photographer Ian Alderman reviews the images of “Recovering the Past” with Belgium’s HRH Princess Astrid and Vice Prime Minister Didier Reynders
at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, in December 2015.
Photo courtesy of Jean-Pol Schrauwen.

Britain’s Prime Minister, Theresa May, on her recent visit to the current exhibition of "Recovering the Past" with the photographer, Ian Alderman,
and assistant curator Dominiek Dendooven, at the In Flanders Field Museum in Belgium.
Photo courtesy of U.K. Ministry of Defence.
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Photographer Ian Alderman.
Photo courtesy of the author.

The archival components of the photographs are all high-

The current exhibition of Recovering The Past at the In

resolution digital scans of the original priceless, glass plate

Flanders Fields Museum, Ypres, is open to the public from

negatives, supplied for this project by the National Archives

3 June 2017 through 31 December 2017. For more information,

of Australia. Working with these scans was one of the privi-

please see: http://www.flandersfields.be/en/1917/flanders-fields-

leges of this project. The image quality and sharpness of those

museum.

glass plate scans can still challenge the digital files produced

The author retains copyright of all images published.

by a modern digital camera.
Its timely relevance notwithstanding, Recovering The Past
stands alone in allowing the viewer to contemplate the consequence to society of the long-term legacies of conflict. The
philosophy of the entire project is brought to a conclusion in
the final image, which reverses the project’s narrative to show
an inevitable future consequence of war.
Recovering The Past has significant educational value and
can engage its younger viewers simultaneously in art, history,
and digital manipulation techniques. It also suggests to viewers that it is possible to engage with history using modern digital technology alongside the more traditional methods.
See endnotes page 67

Ian Alderman
Photographer
London, UK
Commercial website: www.ianalderman.com
Project website: www.recoveringthepast.com
Ian Alderman discovered and subsequently developed his passion for photography through a desire to capture the drama of the
great outdoors. On graduating from the Blackpool and The Flyde
photography course in 1992, Alderman worked predominantly in
assisting and production roles within the corporate and advertising photography genre. Subsequent and extensive work as both a
photographer and location scout have given him a broad background
from which to produce projects such as “Recovering The Past.”
A complex project, over five years in the making, “Recovering The
Past” has been produced with the commemorations of the First
World War at its heart. With his great grandfather himself a casualty of the tragic conflict, this project represents his personal
tribute to his great grandfather and all of those who lived, fought,
and died in circumstances and conditions we simply cannot imagine today.
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Field Notes

Preparing for the Future:
How the SDGs Impact Mine Action
by Ursign Hofmann [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ] and
Olaf Juergensen [ United Nations Development Programme ]

National Mine Action Authorities
(NMAA) have a major role to play at
the intersection between global policy shifts and national/local level realties. Whereas the SDGs are of a global
nature, more country-specific areas of
work, such as mine action, are not explicitly identified but rather anticipated
to be addressed via national SDG frameworks. These nationalization processes

A

are unique opportunities for NMAAs to

Figure 1. The Sustainable Development Goals.

mainstream mine action and ensure ap-

Figure courtesy of the United Nations.

the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030

goals, targets, and indicators).

Agenda) and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals

Several countries affected by landmines and explosive rem-

(SDG) entered into effect on 1 January 2016 to guide develop-

nants of war (ERW) have taken first steps in that direction.

ment efforts.1 The SDGs are in the early stages of implementa-

In Afghanistan, the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination

tion and are still being mainstreamed into mine action. This

(DMAC), with support of the United Nations Mine Action

article draws on a timely study from the Geneva International

Service (UNMAS), successfully voiced the importance of mine

Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the United

action with the Ministry of Planning, in charge of designing

Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that aims to stim-

the national SDG framework, and was tasked to propose mine

ulate collective thinking in the sector, provides policy recom-

action indicators. The governments of Cambodia and Lao PDR

mendations, and offers implementation tools.2

decided to formulate a national SDG 18 to address the negative

From Global to National: The Sustainable
Development Landscape

development impacts of contamination and to assist victims.

The 2030 Agenda envisions development to be sustainable—

i.e., balancing economic development, social equity, and environmental protection. Sustainable development is viewed as
being participatory, inclusive, and nondiscriminatory so that
“no one is left behind,” particularly the most vulnerable and
marginalized in society.1
The 17 SDGs, subdivided into 169 global targets and 230
indicators, serve as the 2030 Agenda’s results and reporting framework. The SDGs (and their targets) are indivisible
and linked together in response to the interconnectedness
of the challenges of our time. 3,4,5 They need to be tailored to
national contexts, needs, and priorities through a national
SDG framework.
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The 2030 Agenda: A Game Changer

National SDG frameworks will form the basis for nation-

al development efforts, sectoral plans, and country-specific
U.N. development frameworks. The SDGs are also expected
to serve as the reference for development policies and financing.5 Mine action is guided by treaty implementation, humanitarian imperatives, human rights approaches, and now the
SDGs, which overarch, connect, and reinforce these different
frameworks. Consequently, many mine action organizations,
NMAAs, and donors are trying to adapt to this new policy
and programming environment while aligning their strategies with the SDGs.
The 2030 Agenda is seen as a ‘game-changer’ in that it

of violence and related death rates everywhere.” The reestablishment of safe physical living environments is, however, not only an objective in itself, but also an enabling precondition that makes possible and accelerates many other
development activities.
Analyzing links helps to identify expected and unexpected
SDG contributions of mine action activities. It also widens
the perspective on the impact of mine action’s work on sustainable development. For instance, the strong SDG focus on
vulnerability and social protection provides a new pathway
to address the rights of indirect mine/ERW victims through
broader efforts. More importantly, data will be critical to validate or invalidate these links; an area that both the GICHD
Then U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Prime Minister of Lao
PDR, Tongloun Sisoulith, at the launching of SDG 18 (September 2016).
Photo courtesy of the United Nations and Eskinder Debebe.

calls for the global community to go beyond business as
usual in planning, delivery, monitoring, and reporting.
Naturally, several how questions arise for the mine action
sector, for example

*
*
*
*

How can we better articulate the catalytic contribution
of mine action to sustainable development and ensure
more coherence with broader development priorities?
How can we strengthen our outcomes and indicators to
report against broader frameworks?
How can we improve participation of and inclusiveness
for those at risk of being left behind?
How can we diversify and innovate our financing?

Mine Action Contributions to Sustainable
Development in the SDG Era

and UNDP are working on through their support to mineand ERW-affected countries.

More Coherence Between Mine Action and
Sustainable Development
It is a demanding task to operationalize the conceptu-

al connections with sustainable development in mine action
planning, implementation, and reporting. Only by further
breaking down the remaining silos between sectors will more
coherent and integrated policies and programs be achieved.
For mine action to obtain greater results in planning and delivery, it will need to strive to be better aligned with broader
national SDGs, especially as the implementation of the 2030
Agenda gains traction at the country level.
The SDG framework makes it possible to deliberately plot
and record mine action interactions with broader sustainable
development sectors such as agriculture, education, natural resource extraction, and tourism. This will help to facil-

As national and sectoral development plans are now ex-

itate mine action mainstreaming into budgets, planning,

pected to be underpinned by the SDG framework, any con-

implementation, and monitoring within these other sectors.

tribution by mine action interventions to these plans—and

Moreover, the framework provides more coherence and coor-

sustainable development at large—may only be fully recog-

dination that will potentially influence mine action priority

nized if mine action stakeholders can articulate and docu-

setting and decision making.

ment how they contribute to the achievement of SDG targets.

For this to happen, it is important to communicate with key

It is therefore pivotal to understand how mine action ac-

government and local community stakeholders on the role

tivities can accelerate progress across the SDGs and how the

that mine action can play in contributing to the SDGs, par-

latter may form part of a mine action Theory of Change. A

ticularly when engaging with practitioners who rely on mine

2017 study carried out by the GICHD and UNDP revealed

action as an enabling activity for their humanitarian and de-

that twelve SDGs are, in one way or another, of direct rele-

velopment work. Their increased awareness can open new

vance to mine action.2 Furthermore, mine action is positioned

doors for cross-sectoral partnerships that are at the core of

to contribute to the attainment of four other SDGs indirectly

SDG implementation.

(see Figure 2). Across the SDGs, mine action can contribute to
more than 50 SDG targets.
SDG 16 provides the most direct entry point, especially
its target 16.1 that seeks to “significantly reduce all forms

Measuring Mine Action Results Version 2030

Many mine action stakeholders have made signifi-

cant achievements toward reporting changes in lives and
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Figure 2: Major direct and indirect links between the SDGs and mine action.
Photo courtesy of GICHD and UNDP.

livelihoods.6,7,8 However, more evidence is needed to demon-

priority setting, definition of success indicators, and data col-

strate exactly how mine action is catalytic at scale. To date,

lection/disaggregation are some areas that lend themselves

indicator development, monitoring, and reporting have often

particularly well to learn who are and are not benefitting, to

been comparatively weak links in project management and

increase community involvement, and to strengthen account-

implementation.

ability to those we serve.

Therefore, standardizing and aligning mine action outcomes with global, national, or sectoral reference targets and
indicators will be critical to positioning mine action within
broader development planning at many levels.9 Furthermore,

Fresh Pathway for Mine Action Financing and
Innovation

Mine action funding decreased each year from 2012 to 2015.11

information management systems can be refitted and better

At the same time, development funding is expected to become

connected to feed into national SDG data collection mecha-

increasingly tied to SDG implementation. Positioning itself to

nisms that are at the heart of SDG reporting. Figure 3 provides

benefit from this SDG-earmarked funding will demand that

an example of possible SDG-aligned mine action outcomes
and associated indicators related to SDG 4 and SDG 16.

New Impetus for Participatory and Inclusive
Mine Action

Mine action often finds itself at the forefront of efforts to

help marginalized and shattered communities rebuild their
lives. Differences and inequalities between women and men,
and amongst social groups can, however, lead to mine action dividends not always benefitting all members of society
equally.10
Precisely, the SDGs put those at risk of being marginalized
at the center of interventions. This provides an opening for the
mine action sector to place a renewed, deliberate emphasis on
participation and inclusiveness. Strategic planning processes,
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Figure 3: Illustrative SDG-aligned mine action outcomes and indicators.
Figure courtesy of GICHD and UNDP.

Previously mine-contaminated land becoming a rice field, Cambodia.
Photo courtesy of UNDP, Cambodia.

mine action is able to clearly demonstrate the development
outcomes of its work. The SDGs offer an innovative pathway
to do so, whereby the sector becomes more relevant to nontraditional public funding streams. What is more, the SDGs
also provide a shared narrative to engage with new actors, such
as the private sector or philanthropic organizations, which are
expected to step up their role in SDG implementation.12

Seiz ing the Opportunity

The 2030 Agenda offers an important opportunity for mine

action at this critical juncture in its 20-year history. It is a
pathway to heighten mine action’s relevance to and main-

Ursign Hofmann
Advisor, Policy
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
Ursign Hofmann is Policy Advisor at the
GICHD, conducting research on legal and
policy aspects of mine action in relation
to broader human security. Before joining the GICHD in 2011, he worked with
the Joint Inspection Unit of the United
Nations on a comprehensive review of the
United Nations in mine action. He holds
a Bachelor of Arts degree in history and political science as well
as a master’s degree in history and French from the University of
Lausanne (Switzerland).

streaming into broader sustainable development, while
strengthening participation, inclusiveness, and accountability. Demonstrably aligning mine action with the SDGs can
help re-energize and boost partnerships with the broader
peace and development communities, increasing mine action’s overall impact and its contribution to reaching the 2030
Agenda’s pledge to “ensuring no one is left behind.”
See endnotes page 67

Olaf Juergensen
Development and Mine Action Specialist
United Nations Development Programme
Olaf Juergensen has over 25 years field
experience working on early recovery and peacebuilding issues. He is currently UNDP Regional Development and
Mine Action Specialist based in Istanbul,
Turkey, and provides support to mineaffected countries in Europe, Central
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
Juergensen served as Chief Technical Advisor to the National
Institute for Demining (IND) in Mozambique and the National
Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR) in Jordan. In
Angola, he managed UNDP’s support to the National Demining
Institute of Angola (INAD) and the National Commission for
Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH). Juergensen
holds a doctorate in Geography from Queen’s University (Canada).
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Field Notes
Using Small Unmanned
Aircraft (SUA) in HMA

W

by Andy Smith [ University of Genoa ]

ith the growing use of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV) within humanitarian mine action (HMA),
the need for standardized training is becoming in-

creasingly important to mitigate factors that may otherwise
inhibit their wider use. The first formal training course for
people in HMA to qualify as small unmanned aircraft (SUA)
pilots served as an opportunity to pursue this goal and was
held at the MAT Kosovo training centre in September 2017.1
The instructors were from a U.K. company training to U.K.
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) standards for commercial
SUA pilots.2,3 Although drone and UAV are popular terms
to describe all umanned aircraft, the term SUA is used by
some civil aviation authorities to describe specifically lightweight models.

4,5

Image 1. Taken from a quadcopter, this photograph shows the people attending the training course in Kosovo.
Image courtesy of Training Solutions - Unmanned Aviation Services.

Those in attendance included trainees from across the HMA
sector: field workers from Libya and Syria, dog handlers, serv-

that safety, privacy, and security concerns are addressed in ways

ing soldiers, and researchers. One trainee was a qualified explo-

that give national mine action authorities the confidence to au-

sive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician and also a software

thorize the controlled use of SUA in HMA.

developer who attended in order to benefit interdisciplinary research. Some students had extensive flying experience, while
others had none, but all learned a great deal from the profes-

Safety, Privacy, and Security

The uncontrolled use of any unmanned aircraft raises safe-

sional instructors over five intense days that included many

ty, privacy, and security concerns in every country. Civilians

testing flights.

wanting to use unmanned aircraft commercially in the United

The course was offered because national and supranation-

Kingdom must be registered with the CAA and demonstrate

al civil aviation authorities around the world are increasingly

an appropriate level of training for the category of aircraft that

controlling the use of unmanned aircraft of all sizes and re-

they will fly. Remote pilot certification is granted for a category

quire pilots to have demonstrated proficiency.6 The main driv-

of aircraft and a maximum take-off weight.

ers behind this are air safety, privacy, and security concerns;

Safety. Wherever HMA operators work, concerns about air-

these same concerns also apply in HMA. During the train-

craft safety—terrestrial and in the air—can be addressed via

ing, many who attended helped contribute to the first, gener-

the imposition of best practice pilot training requirements and

ic SUA standard operating procedures (SOP) for HMA, which

aircraft deployment rules that are imposed by the relevant civ-

the author was there to draft. The SOP is intended to ensure

il aviation authorities. However, when the relevant national

7

Images 2–4. Training took place in the classroom, on simulators, and in the air with a range of SUA.
Images courtesy of the author.
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HMA Experience with SUA

Despite the fact that the concept of eye in the sky has yet to

be fully explored, it is no surprise that the pilot training course
hosted by MAT Kosovo was well attended because the utility of SUA in HMA has already been proven. From the early
iterations of the large Schiebel Camcopter to today’s battery
powered SUA, there have always been obvious advantages in
gaining a low-altitude overview of the working area.9 Aerial
imagery is widely used in HMA. Image 9 is a screenshot show-

Image 5. Part of an ISIS, fixed-wing-SUA factory after its capture in
2017.

ing destroyed ammunition storage bunkers at the Waddan

Image courtesy of Conflict Armament Research at http://www.confictarm.com.

weapons storage site in Libya made in 2012. Even high-level
images like this were a great help when trying to assess the ex-

authority is inoperative or has yet to publish requirements, the

tent of the problem faced at that time.10 The resolution in Image

adoption of those published by internationally respected civ-

8 is low, does not show the target from all angles, and is not as

il aviation authorities can be the next best option for anyone

up-to-date as an image recorded minutes ago.

concerned with showing that they have done everything possible to manage risk.

Some international nongovernmental organizations (INGO)
have used commercially available SUA when identifying high-

Privacy. While privacy concerns may be covered in rele-

risk areas and planning deployments for years. Norwegian

vant civil aviation authority flight restrictions, HMA opera-

People’s Aid (NPA), for example, reported on the use of a

tors should also respect the concerns of the people in the flight

commercial quadcopter camera system in Iraq during 2014.

path, particularly when flying with a downward facing cam-

The SUA was used for basic task planning and to closely

era. Ignoring local concerns about personal privacy can be a

inspect possible hazards during pre-deployment survey. Since

risk to both the aircraft and its pilot, so good community liai-

the pictures in image 9 were taken, automatic mapping systems

son and response is usually required in HMA.

and support software have improved dramatically, and the list

Security. Broader than the invasion of privacy involved in
camera overflights, security concerns involve even the smallest category of unmanned aircraft, the SUA, which can be
readily adapted for weapon delivery. In Syria, for example, the

of potential uses has grown.

SUA Utility for HMA

During the pilot training at MAT Kosovo, participants

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has manufactured many

compiled the following list of ten generic uses for SUA with-

SUA for uses ranging from combat reconnaissance to flying an

in HMA:

explosive payload directly into a target. Notably, ISIS has purchased commercially available SUA, overcome their software
restrictions, and adapted them to carry and release bombs.
Security concerns are legitimate and the weaponizing of SUA
is a concern that must be recognized, respected, and answered
by those using SUA as tools in HMA, especially in regions
where combat may be ongoing.

1. Close visual inspection.
2. Inspecting vehicles.
3. Mapping.
4. Non-technical survey.
5. Placing disruption/demolition systems.
6. Placing lightweight hook and line equipment.
7. Pre-deployment survey. (continued on page 48)

Images 6–8. This commercially available SUA has been adapted to carry and release the small multi-purpose bombs shown. The bombs were manufactured in an
ISIS factory.
Images courtesy of Conflict Armament Research at http://www.confictarm.com.8
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Image 9. Screenshot of destroyed ammunition storage bunkers at the
Waddan weapons storage site, Libya.

Image 10. Quadcopter photo of Iraq in 2014.
Image courtesy of Ed Rowe, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Iraq 2014.11

Image courtesy of GoogleEarth.

8. Progress

mapping, quality assurance, and quality

control.

9. Training and testing.
10. Visual survey in building interiors.

Achieving everything on this list would require developing
SUA technology so that it is able to perform the same tasks
as small EOD robots. Also, SUA would need to be capable of
making detailed, interior-camera surveys without retaining
line of sight (autonomously or by control signal enhancement).

Image 11. Screenshot from a video captured by an SUA overflying demolitions.

However, while many of the uses would benefit from technical

Image courtesy of John Fardoulis.12

developments and/or software add-ons, it is apparent that all
have immediate potential.

Better still, as well as increasing efficiency, the effective use of

Apart from conventional and infrared cameras, no com-

SUA should have immediate safety advantages by increasing

plete, functional mine-detection systems for small SUA have

the information available to the operative. However, as with all

been proven in the field. The ability to detect near-surface or

new tools and procedures, the industry must not ask too much

hard-to-discriminate targets by enhanced analysis of visual

of the technology. Safety in HMA is primarily about the safety

imagery and/or the use of hyperspectral and thermal sensors

of the people who will use the land. An absence of visible haz-

may prove valuable, but their use parameters have not yet been

ards cannot prove that there are no hazards present, so the

defined. Moreover, it is unclear whether the existing technol-

temptation to release land based on evidence from a camera

ogy can be made reliable enough for humanitarian use.

overflight alone must be avoided.
See endnotes page 67

Other unexplored examples worth pursing include using a
SUA camera to monitor explosive detection dogs during complex searches or in regular oversight during manual or mechanical deployments. Whenever an operative is obliged to
work entirely alone, an SUA could provide extra information
and allow the operative to receive informed, remote advice or
oversight. During demolitions in which the author was recently involved, using a SUA to inspect the outcome proved useful, often saving time with no reduction in safety. It is probable
that the controlled use of SUA during demolitions will quickly
become routine.

A Cautionary Endnote

There has not been a new technology so useful to HMA since

the development of ground compensating metal detectors.
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Field Notes

Refining Explosive
Safety Outreach

E

by Geoff Carton [ CALIBRE Systems, Inc. ] and
Laura Grindstaff [ Bristol Site Contractors, LLC ]

xplosives safety awareness programs must identify

In 2000, an explosive

the target audience and communicate easily under-

incident

stood concepts. To be effective, an audience must ap-

trespassing on an active

ply the concepts presented; however, this is not enough. The

range and the removal of

program and its message must also be adaptable to a variety of

munitions killed one teenager and injured another. This led

audiences based on how they assimilate information. The U.S.

the U.S. Army to review DoD explosives safety messages and

Department of Defense (DoD) has at least 100 years of safety

programs. The review found that DoD military services had

education experience. Over this time, explosives safety mes-

different messages. Some focused on soldiers, while others

sages underwent several evolutions.

focused on the public or specific risks (e.g., former ranges,

that

involved

The 3Rs.mil home page. A variety of materials
and activities for differing audiences are available from the website.
Photo courtesy of CALIBRE Systems, Inc.

Early DoD efforts focused on munitions that soldiers

souvenirs). While well intentioned, the differing materials di-

brought home as war trophies and that souvenir hunters re-

luted their effectiveness. This led the Army to develop a core

covered from military sites. News articles post-World War I

message: the 3Rs (Recognize, Retreat, Report) that focus-

and II discouraged people from collecting munitions by us-

es on dangers munitions pose and encourages safe behavior

ing graphic descriptions of explosive safety risks involved in

should a munition or suspect munition be encountered. The

handling munitions. The target audience post-World War II

objective was to create a safety message simple enough to be

broadened to incorporate communities near military instal-

understood by all ages but broad enough to address a variety

lations, including installations that were used for war-time

of audiences (e.g., souvenir collectors, construction workers)

training but had returned to public use. News articles post-

and activities (e.g., outdoor recreation, divers).

World War II describe an intensive DoD program to remove

With input from focus groups that included risk communi-

munitions from lands once used for live-fire training and

cators, explosives safety professionals, parents, and educators,

testing. They also informed the public of hazards associated

the Army crafted the 3Rs as its core explosives safety message.

with collecting scrap metal and souvenirs from these areas.

The Army developed educational materials including safety

The effectiveness of the munitions removal effort was lim-

guides, briefings, signs, and explosives safety presentations

ited by the then-current technology and at many sites only a

around this core message. The goals of the 3Rs Explosives

surface clearance was completed.

Safety Education Program are to:

Despite DoD efforts to communicate explosives safety messages, injuries to soldiers and civilians of every age continued.
DoD began to examine the further cleanup of munitions sites
circa 1983 after a detonation killed two children playing with
a munition they encountered near their home. When DoD’s
Defense Environmental Restoration Program was established
in 1986, its main goal was preventing hazardous chemical
contamination, but efforts to detect and dispose of unexploded ordnance, which endangers soldiers and civilians alike, became more organized. Munitions kept as souvenirs, collected

*

Provide a simple, consistent, and easily remembered

*

Eliminate redundant efforts and contradictory messages;

*

message;
and
Develop 3Rs Program educational material to be

* General enough to apply to a variety of audiences and
activities; or

* Tailored to specific audiences (e.g., children), activities

(e.g., fishing, construction), or communities (e.g., civilians, military families).

for their historical value, or simply disturbed by human con-

After 2000, the 3Rs Program became DoD’s basis for in-

tact on military ranges have also injured or killed a number of

forming the public of dangers associated with encountering

adults. These incidents and differing audiences led DoD to de-

munitions and avoiding injury. A 2011 study of munitions-

velop a variety of safety materials based on the program and

related incidents on properties no longer under DoD control

funding rather than consistent message.

determined that munitions were intentionally disturbed in at
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least 20 of the 24 incidents and exposed on the surface in every case. In addition, the majority of the individuals injured
or killed were male. As a result, the Army increased the focus of its 3Rs Program for at-risk populations (e.g., children,
particularly boys because over half of the fatalities were children and 90 percent of the children were boys) and behaviors
(e.g., moving or disturbing munitions). The Army then initiated an independent assessment to evaluate the effectiveness

munition or suspect munition is encountered. The Army’s
message evolved to be more uniform:

*

Recognize when you may have encountered a munition

*

Retreat, do not approach, touch, move or disturb it, but

*

and that munitions are dangerous.
carefully leave the area.
Report the munition to local law enforcement and advise
them of what you saw and where you saw it.

of 3Rs Program materials. Rather than employing a tradition-

In 2015, the Army redesigned its 3Rs Program website

al questionnaire or survey, the assessment consisted of nearly

(http://3Rs.mil) making it easier to use, accessible to mo-

100 one-on-one dialogues with children ages 9–12 at schools

bile devices, and better at conveying the danger associated

near former military installations that represented a variety of

with munitions and safe behaviors for given audiences (e.g.,

communities and cultures.

children, teens, adults).1 A variety of 3Rs Program materi-

The assessment indicated that participants exhibited an

als including files for printing, videos, and presentations are

understanding that munitions were dangerous, and civilians

available from the redesigned 3Rs website. Its new design al-

should not move or disturb them. However, it also identified

lows for easier navigation to content appropriate for a variety

knowledge gaps and unintended responses for important de-

of groups: children and families, military and their families,

tails of the 3Rs message. Some of the knowledge gaps indicated

community, and workers.

student confusion regarding the use of different terms and ex-

The Army’s 3Rs Program is now generally accepted as

planations for munitions-related concepts. Presentations in-

DoD’s 3Rs Program. To remain effective, DoD 3Rs Program

troduced munitions-related vocabulary that students needed

must continue to evolve and adapt.

to learn to fully understand the core message. The assessment

See endnotes page 66

indicated that most students could not understand every con-

The opinions expressed in this article are the authors’ own

cept presented during a one-time presentation. Additionally,

and do not necessarily reflect the views of their employers, the

the result was a muddled understanding of how dangerous

DoD, or the U.S. Government.

munitions could be and confusion about the meanings of retreat and report.
The evaluation indicated that some of the 3Rs methods
used to communicate its message (e.g., classroom, printed
media) were more effective for certain audiences. An individual visiting an area where munitions are present could benefit
from receiving a pamphlet about the potential hazard and appropriate safety behaviors, while people living and working
in communities near sites with munitions benefit most by attending a 3Rs presentation where they can ask questions. In
military families, children are likely to complete 3Rs coloring
books with their parents, benefiting the entire family. Finally,
soldiers who already understand the dangers associated with
munitions may be more effectively influenced by public service announcements focusing on their professional responsibilities and the potential danger that munitions present to
their families.
Refinements the Army made to the 3Rs Program since
2011 have focused on recognizing the dangers associated with
munitions over understanding munitions-related concepts.
These refinements also better emphasize safe behaviors over
other responses (e.g., curiosity) or reactions (e.g., the desire
to identify the item, the instinct to pick up an item) when a
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Field Notes
The Collaborative ORDnance Data
Repository (CORD): 2018 Upgrades
by Roly Evans [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ] and Erik de Brun [ Ripple Design ]

T

he Collaborative ORDnance
Data Repository (CORD) has
been in existence since 2015.

It is a database of over 5,000 entries detailing a wide range of explosive ordnance. The database is used extensively
as a means of identifying munitions by
those working in the field of humanitarian mine action, but also by others.
Users range from mine clearance operators in Sri Lanka, police bomb disposal teams in Florida or Abu Dhabi,
human rights advocates in Washington,
D.C., to journalists in London. CORD
is not intended as a detailed database. It
is intended as a simple online ordnance
identification guide with limited detail,
accessible to all.
CORD grew out of the old ORDATA

Figure 1. The revised CORD user interface showing the updated list of 18 Ordnance Types (often
known as Ordnance Categories). In time, further Ordnance Types may be added.
All graphics courtesy of GICHD/CISR.

database formerly hosted on the website of the Center for International
Stabilization and Recovery (CISR) at
James Madison University. This was a
U.S. Government database of mines and
explosive remnants of war (ERW) released in 1997 to assist humanitarian
demining work. CORD was developed
as an improved user interface for those
seeking to search more than 5,000 entries in ORDATA.
In early 2017 it was determined that
an upgrade of the CORD system would
be desirable. The initial system architecture, which was based on an ontology,
was designed to maximize interoperability with external databases and enable
future integration of a complex, semantic search system. An ontology is a

Figure 2. The revised CORD user interface showing the card view of entries, in this case for one
of the new Ordnance Type listed in CORD, Submunitions.
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type of database where the data is stored using the Resource
Description Framework (RDF) data model in the form of
subject–predicate–object expressions, known as triples. This
type of database allows for interoperability with other ontologies without the need for lots of additional development. After
two years it became clear that interoperability opportunities were limited (and potentially problematic), and a semantic search capability was not required. At the same time that
the main benefits of the ontology were not being realized, the
drawbacks of such architecture were becoming increasingly
problematic. It was clear that the ontology severely limited the
search performance of CORD (i.e., its speed and reliability).
This was noted both internally and through feedback from site
users. In addition, it became clear that data quality was a real
issue and some of the specifications and imagery required updating. For example, numerous items had incorrect values for
explosive content. Moreover, some of the information within
what should only ever be an ordnance identification guide was
inappropriate. This included neutralization and disposal options for ordnance alongside recommendations for transport.
Information such as this should only be made available to professional explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operators and
should not be detailed in a basic free online database.
The task of revising CORD started in February 2017. The
GICHD signed a memorandum of understanding with CISR
confirming joint ownership of the database, where GICHD assumed operational control including day-to-day maintenance
and development responsibilities. GICHD proceeded to revise
the database architecture and page structure prior to commencing ongoing efforts to check specifications and add improved imagery to entries.

Change from Ontology to Relational
Database

Given the requirements of CORD, it was clear that a rela-

tional database was most appropriate for the relatively simple dataset of just over 5,000 entries. A relational database
stores data as relations in tabular form, i.e., as a collection of
tables with each table consisting of a set of rows and columns.
Perhaps the majority of relatively small databases in widespread use today are based on the relational database model.
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Figure 3. The revised CORD entry layout for the BLU-26 submunition. Note
the new Associated Evidence section detailing the fragmentation found
from such a submunition. Such fragmentation can be important evidence
for those conducting survey or clearance. Also note the new Useful Links
section detailing links to other relevant websites.

These tend to be simpler and easier to adapt to changing needs

prior to being integrated into CORD. Unfortunately, errors

over time. A relational database would make it more difficult

do exist in even the better ordnance databases. The improve-

to integrate with external ontologies; however, opportunities

ment in the performance of the search functions and the site

were limited in this area, and in any case it was clear that this

in general, that would come with using a relational database,

was no longer a significant consideration. Moreover, even if

were immediately apparent. The switch improved stability of

other external ontologies could be accessed, it was not clear

the system because workarounds that had been put in place to

how the information extracted would be checked for quality

help improve the ontology performance could be eliminated.
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New Features in CORD

Aside from changing to a relational database, a number of

new features were added to CORD. These include:

*

A What’s New section gives users easy access to the

*

Ordnance items can now be sorted allowing ordnance

items most recently updated.
records to be viewed in multiple ways (card or list view)
and sorted by name or date added/modified. A button in
the top right of the user interface screen was added to al-

*

low items to be shown in chronological order.
A number of new fields and field types were added to
the database, including an Associated Evidence section detailing evidence associated with particular munitions, such as packaging or fragmentation. This can
be particularly useful for entries such as AP Mines,
AV Mines, and Submunitions. A Useful Links section was also added, identifying good technical websites
with further information on a given item of ordnance:
e.g., Submunition and Cluster or Dispenser entries
might have a link to the GICHD Cluster Munition

*

Identification Tool (CMID).
Improvements to backend data editing and entry of
CORD were made, allowing features such as captions
for individual images as well as editing capabilities for
new fields. The systems that record all changes to CORD

*

were also improved.
A series of analytics dashboards were added to provide
insight into site statistics and usage patterns. This will
enable GICHD to identify necessary site improvements

*

including usage in particular regions.
CORD administrators can now export raw data more

Figure 4. The old CORD entry layout for the PRB-BAC anti-personnel (AP)
mine. Note the old Disposal Options that are no longer a part of CORD.
Also note the generic disposal diagram showing charge placement on an
M-19 AV mine, an M-16 AP bounding fragmentation mine, and on a generic anti-vehicle mine. Such diagrams will be progressively removed from
CORD entries over the coming months.

easily and export a group of ordnance items to PDF.
In time, this could lead to ordnance guide extracts of

them as a separate group in their own right. Some categorize

CORD being available on special request. Given the

rocket propelled grenades (RPG) as rockets, some as grenades,

quality management requirements involved, such re-

others categorize RPGs as recoilless projectiles. It is unlikely

quests are likely to be resource intensive and thus only

that a categorization system that would please everyone ful-

available at the discretion of the GICHD.

ly could be chosen. However, the slightly expanded Ordnance

Changes in CORD Content

Type list adopted is hopefully a reasonable compromise and
an improvement on what was used before.

A number of changes in the content of CORD were made.

The number of ordnance types listed in CORD has ex-

Foremost among these changes was revising the categoriza-

panded from eleven to eighteen. The old Landmines type has

tion of ordnance, known historically as Ordnance Type in

been split into AP Mines and AV Mines. What was previously

CORD (the equivalent of Ordnance Type in the Information

designated as Scatterable Munitions is now split between a

Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) is Category).

new Ordnance Type, Submunitions and others, such as AP

It should be clearly stated that there is no internationally

Mines. Mortar Rounds were previously listed as Projectiles.

agreed system of categorizing ordnance. For example, some

Technically, this is perfectly reasonable, but it was decid-

categorize mortar rounds as projectiles. Others categorize

ed that since the Projectiles group was so large, it would be
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good to split off a new Ordnance Type categorized as Mortar

improvised victim operated AP mines in countries such as

Rounds. Other new Ordnance Types include Fuzes, Small

Colombia. New entries must be created to reflect the situation

Arms Ammunition (SAA) (for projectiles ≤ 20 mm), Naval

on the ground. Please help us by sending any relevant infor-

Ordnance, Firing Devices and Switches, Demolition Stores,

mation on these items, be it a Hell Cannon in Syria or a chem-

and Locally Manufactured Munitions (LMM). LMM is an

ical AP mine in Colombia.

Ordnance Type for all the artisanal munitions being pro-

In short, CORD needs your help. If you are in the field and

duced, e.g., in areas of Syria. An 82 mm, high explosive mor-

can confirm an item is being used in a given country but is

tar round produced in a workshop would be categorized as

not reflected in the CORD database, please get in touch using

a LMM. A challenge in populating this Ordnance Type will

the contact details on the CORD website. Better still, if you

be naming items—the range of different models often do not

have a photo of an item in the field and are willing for it to be

have agreed model names or titles. More Ordnance Types

on CORD, please send it in. Image copyright using the new

may be added in the future, for example a new Recoilless

photo captions now available will always be acknowledged.

Ammunition type.

Furthermore, if you see an error in CORD, perhaps a speci-

In time, it is possible that entries in CORD will be
subcategorized. For instance, an anti-personnel (AP) mine

fication detail that is incorrect or a detail for which we do not
have but you do, please contact us.

may be subcategorized as an AP blast mine, AP direction-

Usage figures for CORD are encouraging; however, we will

al fragmentation mine, AP omni-directional fragmentation

always need help to make the information more accurate and

mine, AP bounding fragmentation mine, etc. This would be

up-to-date. CORD is an important resource for HMA and be-

a significant task for each ordnance type and would possibly

yond. With your help, it can continue to be so.

be subject to some debate in the industry. Nevertheless, it is
a logical task for CORD to embrace. Ideally there would be

The CORD database can be accessed at: http://ordata.info.

an agreed standardized categorization system for ordnance,

You may follow CORD on social media via Facebook

perhaps as part of the International Mine Action Standards

(@therealcord.id), Twitter (@threalCORD_ID), or Instagram

(IMAS). For now, CORD will only categorize at a first level,

(@cord_id), or get in touch via email CORD@gichd.org.

i.e., Ordnance Type, and at a last level, i.e., the model name
of the item.

Next Steps

The task of improving content in CORD is in many ways

only just beginning. It is a daunting task and the resources
available for this are limited. From late 2017 onwards, GICHD
staff will commence a review of entries, checking for specification accuracy and adding more item imagery where possible.
After all, CORD is primarily an aid to identification, which is
a visual process. There is also a need to fill in some gaps. For
example, some common submunitions do not yet have an entry in CORD. Ordnance Types such as Fuzes and LMM require populating. The process is not time limited; it should go
on for as long as CORD is in existence. Each entry also needs
accurate information about where it is being used. We can
scan social media for evidence of the use of a particular item
in a given country, but this may be difficult to corroborate.
Nothing beats positive identification of items on the ground
by experienced operators.
The use of ordnance in conflicts is constantly evolving and
CORD needs to try to keep up. There are new ordnance categories that represent this, in particular LMM, intended specifically for conflicts in the Middle East but also for items like
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Field Notes

Making Ordnance Identification
Available to Everyone

T

by Howard Rudat [ MAPPS, Inc. ]

he continued focus on the use of mobile technology

that the application is in

in support of humanitarian demining operations

line with their vision for

has not only highlighted how these technologies

the CORD database.

can be adapted and used but has also resulted in tangible tools

There is no greater

that can be put to use now. Despite these advances, the cost

source of information

and availability of these capabilities remains a challenge when

than the local popula-

resources are limited. Together, the U.S. Army’s Unexploded

tion who spend their

Ordnance Center of Excellence (UXOCOE), the Center for

lives working and living

International Stabilization and Recovery (CISR) at James

in the vicinity of land-

Madison University, and the Geneva International Centre for

mines and unexploded

Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) have solved a key part of

ordnance (UXO). Couple

that problem by providing resources and access to make a criti-

this proximity with the

cal set of information available to a wide audience at no cost:

dramatic advances in

the Collaborative ORDnance Data Repository (CORD). CORD

mobile technology, often

provides access to over 5,000 ordnance items that assist demin-

in the most rural areas,

ing organizations in the proper identification of explosive rem-

and you have an oppor-

nants of war (ERW), including data on over 700 landmines.

tunity for the collection

Unfortunately, until recently, this information was only avail-

of a vast amount of in-

able when connected to the internet or when using specific de-

formation regarding the

mining toolsets that included the CORD information.

location and extent of

The resources and access provided by UXOCOE, CISR, and

explosive hazard con-

Figure 1. Landmines Application in Google Play
store.

GICHD respectively have now allowed for the development of

tamination prior to any

an Android-based, mobile application called Landmines App,

surveying operation be-

which contains the 700 landmine records available in the larg-

ing conducted. Having access to technology such as the Landmines

er CORD database. The Landmine App is available as a free

App provides a common tool that allows for a more accurate and

download on the Google Play Store. Anyone with an Android

thorough sharing of information between the local population and

smartphone can now download the landmine information

demining organizations. It is hoped that future versions of this ap-

contained in CORD for use anytime, anywhere—no internet

plication can include information from the field such as updated im-

connection or specialized mobile devices are required. It can

ages that capture what these ordnance items actually look like after

be accessed at http://bit.ly/2qy4t1Q.

being exposed to the elements for decades.

Developed by MAPPS, Inc., this application is seen as the
first step in a crowd-based solution to the global mine problem.
By empowering the local population with information and
tools, they can assist in creating baseline information to assist demining operations in the future. Using the Google Play
Store, users can provide feedback on the application, which
will ensure that future versions of the application are developed based on the needs of the community, making the application even more valuable. Provided the necessary resources
are available, any updates to the Landmines App would be coordinated with GICHD, which now manages CORD, to insure

Figure courtesy of Google.
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Field Notes
The Challenge of Long-term Risk
Management in Mine Action1
by Robert White [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]

S

tates affected by landmines and
explosive remnants of war (ERW)
are faced with a number of diffi-

cult decisions when they establish their
mine action program, such as “how deep
should operators clear?” and “what tasks
should they do first?” The deliberations
and conclusions that ultimately are drawn
together in national standards are part of
an implicit or explicit risk management
approach. Over time, risk assessments re-

quire review and modification to reflect

Figure 1. Program life cycle for mine action: planning for long-term risk management.
All graphics courtesy of GICHD.

different contexts.
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States embark on proactive efforts to find mines and ERW

national context. For example, what are the determined clear-

that pose the greatest risk immediately after a conflict (typi-

ance depth and fade-out requirements, and the potential cost

cally aided by the international community). Thanks to the

of returning to areas and clearing low-density contamination

survey and clearance carried out in the proactive phase, risks

at a later date? Unless recontamination occurs, the commit-

gradually decline. The analysis of risk and the accompanying

ment of additional resources is considered unreasonable since

mine action response must therefore be carried out for various

the costs for logistics and support in clearing the site would

phases in a mine action program. The shorter-term proactive

be roughly doubled. These discussions will inevitably lead to a

phase will imply a heavier investment of targeted resources

review and evaluation of the relative cost of survey and clear-

to reduce the risk to acceptable levels, while long-term risk

ance, and the opportunity costs of resources that are, or can

management (LTRM) issues constitute the reactive phase and

be, made available.

should be mainstreamed into sustainable, nationally-owned

These issues need to be considered against appropriate

structures. This article describes the process of evaluating

strategic planning and risk management methodologies to

the probabilities and consequences of adverse events that de-

develop effective/efficient systems for addressing any remain-

termine long-term risk and the implications of effective risk

ing mine/ERW threat, from proactive survey and clearance

management for how mine action programs are structured

to reactive risk management strategy. National standards

and managed over time.2

and relevant treaty frameworks require every effort in clear-

Establishing country-specific roadmaps for transition from

ing the mine/ERW threat, but there are inevitably diminish-

proactive survey and clearance to a reactive phase is an impor-

ing returns in the investment costs of proactive survey and

tant process for each mine action program, as this should de-

clearance.3 The ratio of items found against land processed is

fine what the residual state will be. It is the prerogative of the

becoming an increasingly important indicator of effective-

national authority to establish what the residual or end state is

ness. Moreover, the cost of clearing areas where no mine/

while working with key stakeholders. The mine action sector

ERW threat is found must be justified more convincingly

has spent much time and energy in productively developing

than suggesting that community confidence building is a

and improving cost-efficient methodologies for land release

sufficient rationale to spend donor millions. The balance and

through survey and clearance of suspected and confirmed

tipping point between proactive survey and clearance and re-

hazardous areas (SHA/CHA). The most difficult element of

active risk management strategy is significant in the life cycle

these discussions involves the criteria for releasing land in a

of a program.
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that would accrue from the extra expenditure of time, resources, or money,
leaving the challenge of managing the
residual mine/ERW threat.
The

International

Mine

Action

Standards (IMAS) define residual risk as
“the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to identify, define and remove all presence and
suspicion of mines/ERW through nontechnical survey, technical survey and/
or clearance.”5 It is logical to understand
Figure 2. The As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) concept (after ISO 21010).

residual contamination as the sites or
areas where mines or ERW are discov-

Life Cycle of a Mine/ERW Program

ered following the application of all reasonable efforts to sur-

mines and ERW becomes less of an immediate emergency and

known SHAs and CHAs in a given locality.6

As a country or region recovers from conflict, clearing

vey/identify and then process (cancel, reduce, or clear) all

high priority, with reactive responses replacing proactive sur-

Reactive management of risks posed by residual contami-

vey and clearance program over varying timeframes. As time

nation requires a different approach to the one that was uti-

goes on, the United Nations, specialist NGOs, and commer-

lized during the proactive survey and clearance phase. This

cial operations terminate programs, and leave or hand over

requires a review of the established institutional architec-

assets to national ownership. All mine action/human secu-

ture, as well as the development of evidence-based systems,

rity programs operate within this continuum, represented in

tools, and processes. Whichever approach is adopted in each

Figure 1. The capacities to respond tend to be confined to a

country-specific scenario will rely on the information that is

few specialist military/police units, civil defense, fire service,

available to assess risk. Quantifying or predicting the known

and commercial service provision, the scale of which is de-

unknowns is problematic and a constraint on stating what

termined by the need of governments and/or market forces.

level of resource may be required to effectively address any re-

4

In countries approaching this transition, there are oppor-

sidual contamination.

tunities to apply principles of strategic planning and risk

It should be noted that risks are not only those that have

management to develop effective risk management systems

the potential to cause direct human harm, but may also in-

addressing any residual mines and ERW that are well adapted

clude those that can inf luence economic activity, freedom

to local circumstances and conditions.

of movement, and other aspects of importance to a society

A Risk Management Approach

and economy.

Reducing risk to a level as low as rea-

sonably practicable (ALARP) should apply to the management of residual mine/
ERW situations (see Figure 2). There are
risks that are generally accepted as being so low that no action is required,
and there are risks that are clearly
unacceptable. Between those two relatively straightforward categories lies a
range of risks and situations. ALARP,
and all reasonable effort (discussed later in the article) embody a concept that
additional survey and clearance cannot be justified in terms of the benefits

Figure 3. National mine action program.
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Figure 5. Risk matrix scoring of xy + y.

or unprecedented, where the rules are unknown or rapidly
changing, or where risks are driven by external factors beyond
their control.7 These risks, which have high impact and low
Figure 4. Real ERW risks.

likelihood of occurrence, are now accepted by many as having
greater importance than those with a high likelihood of oc-

A rigorous approach to responding to all mine/ERW risks

currence and an insignificant impact. In the case of residual

that affect the achievement of a country`s economic objectives

mines and ERW, the concept of impact and the likelihood of

could be one framework on which to base the management of

events occurring should be given prominence in risk assess-

residual mines and ERW. A risk management strategy embed-

ment and processes.8

ded in a national system would allow the potentially negative

The risk matrix in Figure 5 shows an approach to repre-

impact of residual mines and ERW to be mitigated effectively.

senting LTRM in a residual context by increasing the weight-

The objective of residual risk management is to fully under-

ing of the potential impact of an event against likelihood. This

stand the nature of the residual risks to which governments

works on a scoring of xy + y, where x is likelihood and y is

and communities are being exposed, and then implement sen-

impact (Figure 5). This formula multiplies impact with likeli-

sible, cost-effective measures to minimize the downside and

hood then adds a weighting again for impact. It should be re-

maximize the upside (Figure 3).

membered that the scoring of risk magnitude often involves a

The purpose of risk identification is to understand the real-

degree of judgement or subjectivity. Where data or informa-

ity of mine/ERW risks, as opposed to the perception of those

tion on past events or patterns is available, it will enable more

risks. The way in which mine/ERW risks are perceived by soci-

evidence-based risk judgements. In interpreting the risk ma-

ety and the general public is an important part of the context,

trix the color codes are:

but effective management of residual mines and ERW is based
upon identifying and understanding the reality of those risks.
Residual risks only exist when three associated factors combine: an explosive hazard must be present at a location where

*

Red represents major or extreme/catastrophic risks that

*

Amber represents moderate or major risks that score

an activity capable of interacting with the hazard is taking
place or will take place. In the risk diagram (Figure 4), a real
risk only arises in the central red zone of the diagram. All
three contributing factors need to be understood when identifying residual risks of mines and ERW, and that perception of
risk may extend outside the red zone.
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score 15 or more (ALARP: Unacceptable).
between 8 and 14 (ALARP: Tolerable only if risk reduction is impracticable, or if cost is grossly disproportionate

*

to improvement gained).
Blue represents minor or insignificant risks scoring 7 or
less (ALARP: Broadly acceptable region).9

When addressing large, air-dropped munitions, the probability/incidence rate and severe consequence of an accident

Specific countries or regions that moved from a proactive to

would support discussion of a greater weighting of impact

a reactive approach to mines and ERW should note the devel-

on the risk matrix to use a formula of xy + 2y (represented

opments made over recent years in approaches to represent-

in Figure 6). This will allow consideration of the fact that on

ing risk impact and likelihood. Many organizations outside

rare occasions improbable events do occur with devastating

mine action now take account of adverse events that are rare

effects. The weighting of impact brings almost half the risk
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construction, etc., a risk review/response will be needed before activity takes place. Therefore, communication and record keeping during the land release process
is crucial for the future management of residual risk. If the
survey and clearance data is absent or inconsistent, the residual risk management approach has less evidence on which to
base decisions.
This issue is illustrated using data from the LWCC Quang
Tri database in Vietnam. The contamination survey and clearance map (Figure 7) was built using the survey and clearance

Figure 6. Risk matrix scoring of xy + 2y.

management framework results into the ALARP unacceptable region, which is a strategic challenge for finding the
appropriate response to address residual contamination, particularly for residual large, air-dropped munitions.
Locating UXO on a construction site in the United Kingdom
is considered by the Construction Industry Research and
Information Association (CIRIA), as a “high consequence but
low probability event.”10 CIRIA recommends that “appropriate allowance should be made at the design stage for assessing the risk of encountering UXO on-site and for mitigating
that risk if significant,” suggesting that factors such as public
safety, on-site safety, neighboring buildings, secondary hazards, and the safe excavation and disposal of UXO targets are
considerations in developing an investigation methodology.10 A version of this approach should be applied in countries
that reach a residual mine/ERW management state, particularly where large, air-dropped munitions were a feature of
the conflict.

cated a mine or item of ERW located and cleared to the 30 cm
(11.8 in) national survey and clearance depth.
This returns the land to communities in Cam Lo to safe
use for current activity and agricultural practices—a compliant residual state. Any change in land use at a later date,
illustrated in Figure 8, will introduce the residual riskmanagement questions relating to items potentially located below the Vietnam national standard 30 cm (11.8 in) threshold.
The discussions on residual management led to revisiting
the question of what the sector means by safe following survey
and clearance to national standards (when based on IMAS).
The standard clearance depths differ from country to country; e.g., for cluster munition remnants: Cambodia’s is 20 cm
(7.9 in), Lao’s is 25 cm (9.8 in), Vietnam’s is 30 cm (11.8 in).
This represents the national authority agreement, described in
the national standards, on the required risk mitigation to an
acceptable level in order to hand back land to communities
free from immediate threat.

Evidence-based Risk Management

A key area of focus for LTRM must be on the integrity of

survey and clearance data, and how that can be used to inform risk management decision making once the proactive
survey and clearance activity has

records from Cam Lo District, Vietnam. Each red dot indi-

Responsible authorities and mine action operators always
ensure that survey and clearance are completed comprehensively, and record the location, items, and depth, guaranteeing
that everything is documented for a defined handover to the
recognized authority. This activity delivers a specific, defined

ceased.11 Future decision making will
benefit from access to comprehensive
data on survey and clearance. The
risk management issue of clearance
depth relates directly to land use. If
the land is for current agricultural
use in countries such as Cambodia,
Laos, and Vietnam, then the national standard survey and clearance depth does mitigate the threat
to communities. If land use in specific areas changes through infrastructure development, urbanization,

Figure 7. Contamination survey and clearance map of Cam Lo District, Vietnam.
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record of the safe land to allow communities and others to manage future
developments. Inconsistencies in recording data and in data management
remain ongoing challenges for evidence-based LTRM.

Summary

The sector needs to continue asking

“what needs to be done now to ensure
that an effective risk management response can be delivered in the future?”
It is important to be able to support
evidence-based, risk management decision making with comprehensive
data sets on survey and clearance (type
of target, location, depth). It is also important to note that the answer to
“what is safe?" will change over time as
land use changes. Procedures should
be adapted in a residual mine/ERW
management phase to accommodate
this, as has already been demonstrated
in post-conflict scenarios in Europe
addressing UXO from World War I
and II, and in current and concluding
mine action programs, particularly
when related to infrastructure development and construction. There are
key challenges, specific to each country

Figure 8. Land-use change.

that must be overcome. These include
the decision on when to move from proactive survey and
clearance to a reactive risk management strategy response,
and what constitutes every effort, all reasonable effort, or
ALARP to meet treaty obligations and compliance. A risk
management strategy is required to understand residual risk
on areas released through non-technical survey, technical survey, and clearance. The different contexts found in programs
that are geographically and socio-politically diverse will dictate resource management, capacity development, and sustainable choices on relevant tools and approaches, supporting
risk management strategies to react cost effectively to a residual mine/ERW threat.
See endnotes page 67
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BLACK ADDER DISRUPTORS
By Andy Smith [ University of Genoa ] and William Bagley [ JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY ]

T

his article reports on an empirical research and development project conducted in collaboration by researchers
at University of Genoa, Italy, and Johns
Hopkins University, United States. It is a
progress report summarizing one element of
a broader effort that is intended to provide
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operators with reliable, open-source information
to assist in the development of low-order munitions disruptors. Providing operators the
information necessary to make energetic tools
not only reduces cost but can also circumvent
the restrictions and delays that often complicate the import of disruptor components.
MUNITION DISRUPTORS
The disruptors described here use an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) to breach
a munitions’ casing and initiate a burn of the
high-explosive fill. The burn may consume the
entire explosive content but more often leads
to a deflagration, a partial detonation, or a full
detonation. It is accepted that there is always a
risk of high order detonation of the target munition so these disruptors are only used when
a full detonation would be an acceptable, if
undesirable, outcome.
The penetrator is formed by the detonation of an explosive charge inside the disruptor body in contact with a specifically shaped
liner. This has the effect of focusing increased
energy toward the target upon detonation, as
first noted by Munroe in 1888. This phenomenon was extensively studied and exploited for use in the design of weapon systems
and in explosive tunneling procedures. It
was found, for example, that the geometry of
the liner shape is critical for armor penetration and that adding other elements such as
wave shapers inside the charge can further
increase the concentration of the detonation
forces. Complex liner designs are not believed
to be necessary for munitions disruption purposes for which the liner is generally a simple, shallow cap of metal. On detonation of
the disruptor, the liner collapses inward and
is projected under immense pressure toward
the target. Upon penetration of the target, the
energy released should start a fire in the highexplosive (HE) content. If it burns too fast,
the explosive will detonate. If it burns too
slowly, the fire will be extinguished and the
munition left hazardous.

The Black Adder disruptor.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.
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Figure 1. EFP Disruptor components.
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Baldric liners.
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Figure 2. The Black Adder body is designed to control variables
during testing.

Experimental liners.

A commonly used munition disruptor liner is a shallow cap of pressed
copper, commonly called the Baldric. Alternatives that are intended to
increase the probability of low-order neutralization success use pressedsheet magnesium in place of copper.
To provide controls by which to measure success, we used simple
liners of copper and magnesium. Without the time or resources to approach this with the disciplined theoretical rigor that may have been
ideal, we then used an informed but informal approach to design new
disruptor liners that would be low-cost, easy to make, and more reliable
than those commonly used. Strictly controlling variables in empirical
testing allowed rapid progress to be made.

EMPIRICAL TESTING: DAY ONE
The use of a clear, acrylic body was novel. To discover whether its failure to confine the detonation in the same manner as a steel body would
cause problems, we carried out our first series of eight disruptor blast
tests against inert targets.
The tests included a control to allow comparison between a standard,
steel-cased Baldric disruptor and the acrylic-bodied Black Adder disruptor. Both had simple, copper-cap liners, the same stand-off and the
same HE charge. The Black Adder liner penetrated the target to a greater depth and with a larger, cleaner hole than the control. It was also
observed, as an incidental benefit, that the Black Adder body burned
up without fragmentation, which made it less hazardous in use than a
steel body.
We went on to try several liner designs but, with no reliable way of recording the spread of the liner material inside the inert target, we were
not able to learn enough to make any informed comparison between the
various liner behavior after entry.

CONTROLLING VARIABLES
It is known that disruptor reliability can be affected by the presence
of air voids in the HE used to fill the disruptor in the field. It can also
be affected by the distance between the disruptor and the target, and by
the positioning of the detonator in relation to the liner. To control these
variables during testing, we designed the simple disruptor body shown
(see Figure 2).
This Black Adder body design is expensive when compared to using
an off-cut of plumping pipe and wire. It was designed to control variables in liner testing rather than provide a disruptor body that is cheap
to make in the field. It was our intent to control other variables as strictly as practicable so that the only variable that could alter the outcome
would be the new design of liner we made.
All liners were designed to penetrate at least 10 mm of steel and deliver a payload that encourages the HE to burn. Some liner designs were
highly speculative as we experimented with geometry, shaping materials, and fire-inducing payloads in a way that was intended to provide an
indication of which liner would be worth continued testing.
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EMPIRICAL TESTING: DAY TWO
Day two involved testing two control and eight unproven liner designs
against inert targets. A witness piece that would provide a useful comparison of liner designs without using live munitions was devised and placed
inside a length of 5 mm steel box section with a 5 mm steel plate on top.
This arrangement required the new liner to penetrate 10 mm of steel before entering the witness piece, which then provided a useful record of the
intensity and spread of burning material inside the target.
In two series of five disruptor blasts, the effects of eight unproven liners and two controls were recorded. The HE available to charge the disruptors had a lower velocity of detonation than in the original test, but
the results in the series would still be valid for comparison because the
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Disruptor being used against an inert target.

The witness pieces provided a valuable, permanent record of the impact and the spread of material inside the targets.

charge was uniform within that test series.
Analysis of the results allowed two of the experimental liner designs to be discarded and
the remaining six to be ranked in order of
what was believed to be their potential to produce the desired effect.

Witness piece.

Setup showing five Black Adders prepared to fire.

EMPIRICAL TESTING: DAY THREE
On day three, tests of the remaining experimental liners against live munitions was conducted. Generally, there is a greater chance of
causing a detonation with small munitions
because the point of attack with the disruptor
will always be close to the fuze. Test articles

for this series were 82 mm HE mortars that
had been recently manufactured. Being factory fresh was a detail that we hoped would ensure consistency among targets.
In each test, the feet of the Black Adder disruptor were taped in the same position on the
target, and care was taken to ensure that the
standoff, charge weight, and depth of detonator insertion were identical.
The copper control liner was used twice
and, in both cases, the projectile penetrated
both sides of the mortar casing without causing a burn or a detonation. This showed too
much penetration and was an unsatisfactory
result; the mortars were later destroyed using
explosive donor charges.
The magnesium control liner was used
twice and produced different results. In one
instance, the mortar burned out and was
thrown more than 100 meters away. In the
other, the munition deflagrated. Both results
were good, and the result provides evidence
in support of the claim that a pressed magnesium cap has advantages. But the results
showed inconsistency.
Four different Black Adder liner designs
were then tested (two liner designs remain
untested due to lack of range time). When a
liner performed well, the test was repeated to
ensure that the result had a good chance of
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82 mm HE mortar bombs.

A charged Black Adder ready to fire.

Burned out mortar shell (left) and deflagrated munition (right).

An improvised and low-cost disruptor body with
all of the variable control features of those used
in our tests.
New liner one: mortar left in a hazardous condition.

New liner two: deflagrated mortar (left) and burned out mortar shell (right).

New liner three: in both mortars, the HE burned to deflagration.
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New liner four: an ideal result with all HE burned and no fragmentation.

being replicated. If a liner did not demonstrate the desired low-order
disruption, it was not selected for additional tests.

continue as support permits, and we hope that a conclusion of value to
field operatives can be published soon.

NEW LINER ONE
In the first test using one of our experimental designs of liner, the
munition was penetrated and some of the explosive filling had burned;
there was no deflagration and the fuze was left in place. As this was an
unsatisfactory result, the liner was set aside.

See endnotes page 67
We owe a debt of gratitude to Ben Remfrey, Phil Jowett, and the staff
of the EOD and Demining School at MAT Kosovo who coordinated access to demolition consumables and test range support.1 The MAT Kosovo
staff were able to arrange and oversee blast testing with a professional
flexibility and patience that was greatly appreciated. We recommend the
MAT Kosovo R&D support capacity to all researchers in humanitarian
mine action.
Thanks also to the management and staff of the POLIEX factory and
range in Berane, Montenegro.2 The authors also wish to acknowledge varied useful inputs and advice from Cris Chellingsworth, United Kingdom.

NEW LINER TWO
In the first test with liner two, the HE burned and increased pressure inside the mortar and blew off the fuze, leaving some unburned
explosive loose inside an intact casing. In the second test with this
liner, the munition def lagrated. This was a result very similar to that
achieved with the magnesium control liner. Both results were good,
but inconsistent.
NEW LINER THREE
In both tests with liner three, the mortar deflagrated cleanly and a
small amount of unburned HE was expelled. This was almost the best
result possible and showed consistency.
NEW LINER FOUR
In both tests with liner four, the mortar completely burned out with
no deflagration. This was the best possible result and showed consistency; it was also where we ran out of time.
DISCUSSION
The test results demonstrate that using a disruptor liner to deliver
a payload that encourages the explosive content to burn can have advantages in terms of effectiveness and consistency when compared with
simple, metal cap-liners. Results suggest which liners performed best,
but the test set was small and the limited number of tests meant that the
liners included payload and architecture variables that need to be explored further. For example, the geometry of liner four is complex and
may not need to be if it was actually the unique payload that achieved the
desired low-order effects.
Referring back to our goals, the experimental liner materials selection criteria required that they be low-cost and not subject to shipping
controls. The liners and payload ingredients could be imported without
restriction or self-manufactured in any area of need. Some liner architecture is complex, and it is highly probable that similar results can be
achieved with liner designs that would be much easier to make. After
one or more proven liners have been selected for further development,
the improvisation of disruptor bodies using large medical syringes or
similarly locally-sourced material will be explored.
These results are encouraging and provide a limited set of results
from which to refine the designs for further empirical testing. Only after
repeated trials with consistent results will similar tests prove anything
compelling about any individual liner shape or payload. This work will
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Endnotes
Improvised Explosive Devices and the International Mine Action Standards by Rhodes, Ph.D. [ from page 4 ]
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.
16.

An IED is defined as a ‘device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic materials or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate military stores, but are normally devised from nonmilitary components’ (IMAS 04.10 3.134: 2013 & IATG 01.40:2011). Those victim–operated devices laid as landmines are referred to in this paper as locally
manufactured landmines or improvised landmines .
The phrase ‘Humanitarian Mine Action’ is redundant as Mine Action by definition is humanitarian. In this paper Mine Action is used where others may
use the phrase Humanitarian Mine Action.
Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 13.
Email correspondence with The Halo Trust. Statistics current to August 2017.
Email correspondence with MAG. Statistics current to August 2017.
Email correspondence with DAICMA. Statistics current to July 2017.
IMAS 01.10 Section 5.
IMAS 01.10 Section 6.2.
Mine action operators must therefore conduct risk assessments that include proper assessments of the conflict in question and of the actors involved. Such
assessments will examine whether areas being targeted for clearance are permissive environments, where explosive devices are no longer in use for the parties to the conflict, or whether conflict is ‘active’ in a given area and therefore not appropriate for mine action operations.
http://www.mineaction.org/improvised-explosive-device-lexicon.
Understanding the Regional and Transnational Networks that Facilitate IED Use, AOAV, 2017.
For instance IMAS 09.11 concerns Battle Area Clearance ‘including UXO, AXO, booby traps and failed, or abandoned, IEDs left behind after hostilities
have ceased.’
IMAS 04.10 and IATG definition: EO - all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges;
pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices
(IEDs); and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature.
IMAS 04.10 anti-personnel landmine definition - ‘a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons’. The definition of an anti-personnel mine by virtue of its emphasis on the impact of the munition, as opposed to its
construction, includes mines that have been constructed in an improvised manner. This is well documented in the negotiations for the treaty.
See extent of improvised devices from the operational statistics of one mine action operator, MAG: Figures 3 and 4.
Excluding EO of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature; see endnote 10.

Quality Management and Standards for Humanitarian Improvised Explosive Device (HIED) Response Activities by Keeley [ from page 9 ]
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See the UNMAS mine action portal at http://www.mineaction.org/issues.
Assuming victim assistance is mainstreamed into health and disability sectors and supported by specialist organizations that may not be involved in the
‘field’ elements of mine action.
Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0418.
Based on NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering – Improvised Explosive Devices, AJP-3.15 (A) March 2011, Para 0419.
Based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 04.10 2nd Edition Amdt 3, Para 3.168.
See the explanation of response time analysis in “Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action”, Griffin and
Keeley, 2004.
“Indemnify.” The Free Dictionary. Accessed 13 September 2017. http://bit.ly/2h1en9C.

Crossing the Fence: Challenges of Operationalizing PSSM by Isikozlu, Krötz, and Trancart [ from page 14 ]
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Loughran, Chris. “Developing good practice for measuring the success, effectiveness and impact of PSSM”, Manchester: MAG, May 2016. Accessed 4 August
2017. http://bit.ly/2weqsLy.
Other agreements that are in force in the region include the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in
the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, and Bordering States (2004) and most recently, the Kinshasa Convention (2017).
“ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials.” Article 24(1). Accessed 4 August 2017. http://
bit.ly/1wPPgSM.
Van der Vondervoort, Luuk and Michael Ashkenazi. “Practices and approaches towards arms and ammunition management in Mali.” Unpublished report.
Bonn: BICC, 2015.
Van der Vondervoort, Luuk. “’Guns are for the Government’: An evaluation of a BICC advisory project on state-owned arms control in South Sudan.” BICC
Working paper. Bonn: BICC, 2014.

Promoting Secure Stockpiles and Countering Diversion by Berman and King [ from page 18 ]

Any list of partners supporting Small Arms Survey projects would include the Danish Demining Group, The HALO Trust, Handicap International, Mines
Advisory Group, and the United Nations Mines Action Service. Additional partners appear elsewhere in this short article. This list is indicative and not exhaustive.
2. MSAG is an apolitical, informal, and multinational platform of a dozen or so like-minded governments that, to the extent possible, since 2005 have worked
together to support each other’s efforts to improve stockpile management practices across the globe. See www.msag.es.
3. Berman, Eric G., and Pilar Reina. “Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites: Concerns and Consequences.” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action. 16.2
(2012): 4–9.
4. The PSSM Best Practice Cards are available in Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian (BCMS—in the Latin alphabet), French,
Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Swahili.
5. For example, over the past three years, the Survey has added eight incidents and deleted five during the period 1979–2013.
6. See http://bit.ly/2llTGH8.
7. The UEMS Database records 19 events as having occurred in the United States, which have resulted in four dead and two injured. By way of comparison,
while casualty data for many incidents is incomplete (including for those in the United States), the average number of casualties recorded for the other 548
UEMS in the 100 other countries in the database comes to more than 50.
8. The RASR Initiative Steering Committee comprises the International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), the RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearing House
for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), and the Small Arms Survey. The nine participating states since 2009, when the Initiative was
launched, include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia. WRA provided funding
from 2009 through 2015. The European Union is funding RASR for the 2017–2019 period. Moldova has been invited to contribute to the Initiative. For more
information. See www.rasrinitaitive.org.
9. Gobinet, Pierre, and Jovana Carapic. “Less Bang for the Buck: Stockpile Management in South-east Europe.” Small Arms Survey 2015: Weapons and the
World (2015): 125–155.
10. Parker, Sarah. Facilitating PSSM Assistance in the Sahel and Beyond: Introducing the PSSM Priorities Matrix. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2016.
11. Berman, Eric G., Mihaela Racovita and Matt Schroeder. Making a Tough Job More Difficult: Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations. Geneva:
Small Arms Survey, 2017.
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